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INTRODUCTION 
 
The latest Directives implemented in the European Union, concerning financial market and 
financial instrument, operated important changes in financial market’s structure, especially in 
the field of transparency and protection of retail investors. The objective of this dissertation is 
to analyze the Key Information Document and the way in which it changes and improves the 
protection of the retail investors. This tool renovates the disclosure process using an alternative 
approach with respect to the previous form of transparency implemented by the legislator. The 
main news introduced by this tool is the centrality of risk of investment regarding the 
description of the product’s characteristics. The information presented in Key Information 
Document have a numerical nature, which renovates the disclosure process from the 
summarization and visualization viewpoints.  
The themes of investor’s protection and the transparency result relevant since the retailers play 
a fundamental role in the financial market, and without an adequate protection the financial 
industry runs the risk to lose an important share of clients. The loss of faith in the financial 
system after the global financial crisis undermines the efficacy of rules settled in Market in 
Financial Instrument Directive (MIFID). Thus, the legislator operated further upgrades with 
MIFID II, designing an investor’s protection with the aim of gaining back the faith of retail 
investors, lost during the financial crisis. The relation between advisor and retail client is 
influenced by an asymmetric information which makes interesting the way in which the 
legislator manages this delicate situation. Nowadays, the investor’s protection is a recurrent 
problem in the financial market and it is important understand and analyze in which way the 
retail client is protected in the relation with the investment advisor.  
In this dissertation we analyze the Directives and the Regulations which design European 
financial market, taking in consideration the period from the introduction of MIFID to the 
January 2018, data of entry in force of Key Information Document. The analysis compares the 
old transparency’s tools with respect to the KID. The comparison investigates the different 
methodology used by the tools and the motivation which obliges the legislator to design a new 
tool. Being the KID an instrument introduced less than one year ago it has not been possible to 
operate an empirical research on market data to assess the validity of the information reported. 
By the way, the analysis revealed important changes into the legal framework that a retail 
investor needs to know before pursuing an investment in packaged retail insurance-based 
investment product.  
4 Key Information Document, a New Tool to Protect Investors 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follow. The first chapter describes initially the 
European financial market highlighting the necessity of a common European regulation and the 
relevance of relation between investor and financial advisor. Thus, the chapter shows how the 
European legislator regulates the protection of investor before the crisis with MIFID and after 
the crisis through MIFID II and MIFIR, paying particular attention over the consequences of 
the crisis over the new rules of financial transparency. The second chapter analyzes the products 
for which is mandatory the use of KID. These products are known as packaged retail insurance-
based investment products (PRIIPs). The description shows different categories of PRIIPs, but 
the central topic is the complexity of the products and the consequent implications for the retail 
investors. Chapter three analyzes the Key Information Document, the analysis is focused on the 
Risk and Return of the product; anyway, all the aspects are well described which concern the 
form and the content of KID. The last chapter concludes the dissertation outlining the 
transparency paradox and the way in which the legislator overcome it with the introduction of 
KID, taking in consideration the centrality of risk and the numerical information. The fourth 
chapter points out also the aspects that should be improved in the future by the legislator to 
guarantee the effectiveness of the new framework of client’s protection.
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1. An Overview on European Financial Market and on the 
Importance of Retail Investors 
1.1. Necessity of a Common Regulation for EU Financial Market 
The concept of financial market involves any market in which occurs an exchange of securities1 
between agents. Essentially it is a multilateral system in which multiple third-party are able to 
interact with the system, buying and selling trading interest in financial instrument2. Securities 
assume the role of supporting tools for the trading interest of agents. There are two main ways 
to participate in this market: provide investment or financing opportunities, through the 
purchase or the issue of securities. There are three different types of activity in the market: pre-
trading activity, trading activity matching interest and post trading activity. Financial market is 
the system which allows to agents to distribute wealth between them and across the time 
horizon.  
Different markets have different characteristics depending on the agents that operate in the 
exchange, types of securities traded and rules it is been operating under. This short definition 
let us understand that financial market, intended as the world financial market, is a well-defined 
complex system3. The complexity is an aspect that characterized the market in general, given 
the double nature of exchange regulation, that is composed by a financial side, more related to 
economical aspect, and by a juridical side. The degree of complexity increases in an exponential 
way taking in consideration the dynamism of financial market. The dynamic nature of 
phenomena is influenced by several different factors that contributed to revolutionize the 
market, in particular in the last years. The mention of some macro-factor helps to identify in a 
practical way the problem that agents have to face.  
In last years, technology contributes to develop a financial market more efficient and integrated. 
On the other side as usually happened, the speed at which the technology improves is higher 
than the capacity of legislators, across the world, to regulate new scenario. The lack of 
regulation in the market allows to agents to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities existing 
in the market. It happened with the globalization of market, the creation of interdependence of 
national economies across the world and consequent cross border situations easy to exploit for 
                                                          
1 Security: include stocks, treasury stocks, bonds, debentures, certificates of interest or participation in profit-
sharing agreements, collateral-trust certificates, preorganization certificates or subscriptions, transferable shares, 
investment contracts, voting-trust certificates, certificates of deposit for a security, and a fractional undivided 
interest in gas, oil, or other mineral rights. By Legal Dictionary, FARLEX  
2 Art 4 Directive 2014/65/EU 
3R.N. MANTEGNA, Hierarchical structure in financial markets, The European Physical Journal B,1999  
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speculators. Nowadays technology go further and the developing of financial engineering 
allows to investors to use new techniques and strategies of investment, that stimulate the 
creation of more sophisticated products offered to the clients. This process in which legislators 
are chasing technology, even if necessary, contributes to overcomplicate the financial market. 
An important factor to take into account is the turnaround of traditional balance of power 
between financial and industrial factors in the investment sector4 that increase the power and 
the importance of financial market. Geopolitical situation is an element to consider since 
diplomatic ties between main world powers can change the financial scenario in a while with 
direct consequences in the world financial market. The complexity of the market, determined 
by a tremendous number of dynamic factors and interlinked between them, let to legislators 
around the world tough issues to solve.  
The European Union is an interesting case to analyze because started to simplify the complexity 
of financial market to improve the efficiency and thus the economic condition of people. The 
first step to reduce the complexity of the European financial market was the constitution of 
European Monetary Union (EMU) in January 1st 1999, even if the effective circulation of the 
currency started in January 1st 2002. Euro reduced the number of currency from eleven to one 
in the first moment and today it is used in nineteen countries paving the way for a less complex 
Economy and so a more uniform market. 
The discrepancies in the regulation of various functions of EU financial markets in national law 
did not allow issuers, financial institution and investors to reap the full benefits5 of a EMU. The 
will of European Legislator was clear since the Financial Service Action Plan (FSAP) in 19996. 
The plan contains a framework to uniform three strategic objectives in the European Union: 
 Wholesale Markets 
 Retail Markets 
 Strengthening Prudential Structures 
This plan was settled to solve some discrepancies in the market, in fact was already possible 
for a financial institution offer service in the whole union, but a range of legal and administrative 
problems have hampered cross border transactions of these financial services. Action Plan had 
not a direct effect over the European Laws. However, it draws up a list of objectives to reach, 
and let us understand the will of European Council to constitute a common regulated European 
                                                          
4 F. Di CIOMMO, Investment advisory under MIFID 2: legal issues, Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, 
2017 
5E AVGOULEAS, The Harmonization of rules of conduct in EU Financial Markets: Economic analysis, 
subsidiarity and investor protection, European Law Journal, 2000 
6 www.eur.lex.europa.eu/legal-content/, will of legislatior contained in section summary of the FSAP 
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financial market. Furthermore, EU regulator has chosen to replace national regulators with a 
more effective alternative also to facilitate the establishment process of EU regulator. The 
purpose of harmonization process of the financial market is oriented to reduce the complexity 
and obtain important upgrades such as: the reduction of compliance cost for intermediaries of 
cross border investment, the elevation of legal certainty and the rise of competition across 
different countries that will increase the efficiency of the market. This development, has the 
potential to lead to a serious weakening of the bargaining power of national regulators and so 
affects the quality of national protection rules and their enforcement7. In fact, without a 
European regulator there were the possible risk that national regulators were influenced by 
incentives of financial institutions, starting a race to reduce investor protection. The 
harmonization could have a twofold effect on the union, improving the previous rules and at 
the same time it coordinates the legislation of different Member State.  
 
1.1.1. Relevance of Investors and Financial Advisory 
The agents in financial market are distinguished according to their role, needs, preferences and 
behavior8. Mainly the roles played by market agents can be summarized in: Investors, 
Securities’ Issuers and Intermediaries. These roles are not fixed or exclusive for the agents and 
a single subject can perform different functions.  
The investor is an individual or a legal entity who commits money to investment products with 
the expectation of a financial return9, the gain is not free for the investor, but he has to take the 
risk to suffer a loss. In a structured financial market, investors provide important resources to 
the economy and at the same time protect and enhance their wealth. Investors are an important 
source of funds for the market, and it, in order to raise the highest quantity of money, offers to 
investor a huge quantity of investment options. Supply of financial market usually satisfies all 
investors’ requirement, but on the other side the risk of market’s failure to guarantee the perfect 
match between supply and demand is unavoidable. The awareness of parts plays an important 
role in the efficient allocation of securities; weak competence and knowledge derived by a poor 
quantity or quality of information can mislead the investor in the process of choosing the option 
that best suits them, bringing to an inefficient allocation of resources. Unfortunately, mis-selling 
episodes are usual in financial market and often legislator has to intervene especially in a market 
                                                          
7 E AVGOULEAS, The Harmonization of rules of conduct in EU Financial Markets: Economic analysis, 
subsidiarity and investor protection, European Law Journal, 2000 
8 Overview of Financial Markets and Instruments, Pietro Millossovich. 
9 http://www.investorwords.com ,Investor Word Glossary 
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such as EU, which is, as aforementioned, in a consolidated and harmonized process. The main 
risk for the market is to lose an important amount of resources that could help to consolidate 
and reinforce the economy. From this perspective EU cannot incentive the investments in the 
market without a dedicated regulation regarding investors’ protection10. Investor’s protection 
is one of the main arguments that the EU Legislator had considered to improve and create a 
more efficient and transparent market. 
Another activity strictly linked to investor is financial advisory, that is a function carried out by 
intermediaries. This player has an important role in the efficient allocation of resource because 
it is the reference point for retail investor with weak competence and should give 
recommendation in order to satisfy the specific needs of the investor. It is not rare that an 
intermediary performs more types of activities at the same time, and so it could be exposed to 
conflict of interest situation. The conflict concerns the advisors that get paid or receive some 
benefit to sell in the market a specific product. The incentives to deviate for the financial advisor 
can bring to an unsuitable investment for the investors, especially if its financial education is 
inadequate. This phenomenon is present in the whole market and to contrast it Member States 
during the years had to formulate different legislations to regulate financial advisory, EU saw 
this element as crucial for the restructuration of the European financial market since it is not 
only an element to harmonize but a crucial point for the effective improvement of investor’s 
protection in Europe. 
This analysis highlights how much is important the role of the investor as resource, and on the 
other side the threats at which it is exposed in the complexity of financial market. In this kind 
of scenario, the EU regulator has the hard role to implement a harmonized framework, with the 
aim to improve the market efficiency. It shall pursue his objective taking in account that ‘the 
implementation of directives in national law has the disadvantage that the search for applicable 
national provisions based on European law is usually made very difficult’11. 
 
1.2. Historical Evolution of European Financial Markets 
After Investment Service Directive (ISD)12 EU financial market was object of further 
regulation, in fact in 1999 EU Commission designed a Financial Service Action Plan (FSAP) 
in which are settled main strategical objectives to achieve a common regulation. Action Plan 
                                                          
10 G. S. WILLEMAERS, Client protection on European financial markets – from inform your client to know your 
product and beyond: an assessment of the PRIIPs Regulation, MiFIDII/MiFIR and IMD 21, SSRN 
11 T MJ MOLLERS Capital Markets Law in Europe. Too Many Rules. Too Quick and Complicated? ,ISSN, 2016 
12 Directive 93/22/CEE 
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was focused on integration of market (Wholesale market), the security of financial services in 
the market (Retail Market), the strengthen of supervisory and prudential rules. The achievement 
of the aims was planned through the issuing of 42 different measures such as Directives, 
Regulations and Guidelines; within 2005. In addition, were created also the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators13(CESR), with the aim to advise the Commission and to 
coordinate the EU legislation in Member States; and the European Securities Committee14 
(ESC) composed by representatives of Member States, with the purpose to advise the 
commission about technical regulation of market and financial services.  
The most effective tools, that EU Commission has to implement the EU Financial Market, are 
Directives and Regulation. The European Union defines Directive as a legislative act that sets 
out goals that all EU countries must achieve15. The Directive is more than an order but let to 
the Member States some degree of discretion about the way in which national authorities have 
to implement it. The goal must be achieved by Member States within a deadline and are imposed 
penalties otherwise. The advantage of Directives is the perfect suitability between goal and the 
respect of national peculiarities across the Union. The Regulation on the other side is a binding 
legislative act and it must be applied in its entirety across the EU16, this approach is more direct 
than Directive’s one because allow to the legislator to applicate the same rules in the whole EU, 
without the filter of the national legislations. Regulations are more rigid, anyway it gives the 
possibility to EU legislator to reach a very precise objective since must be observed by EU 
citizen like a law. The EU Council shall use properly these forms of law to achieve the goals in 
the better way possible looking at the sensitive equilibrium between harmonization of the Union 
and National identity. 
After the Action Plan, EU legislator started to regulate financial market with some important 
Directives, in the field of transparency an important goal was achieved with the introduction of 
Prospectus, through Directive 2003/71/EC. “The Prospectus shall contain all information 
which, according to the particular nature of issuer and securities offered to the public or 
admitted to trading on a regulated market, is necessary to enable investors to make an informed 
assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position, profit and losses, and prospects of the 
issuer and of any guarantor, and of the rights attaching to such securities”17. It is clear that 
Prospectus is a disclosure document that is mandatory for determine categories of securities, 
                                                          
13 Decision of EU Commission n 527/2001/CE 
14 Decision of EU Commission n 527/2001/CE 
15 https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en#directives 
16 https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en#directives 
17 Art.5, Directive 2003/71/EC 
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designed to ensure a better investment’s assessment. This can be considered the first tangible 
step of EU regulator aimed to protect the rights of investor since it gives useful additional 
information to investors and at the same time constitute a passport for primary market activity. 
Prospectus is going to be analyzed in a deeply way in the following sub-chapter18.  
 
1.2.1. Financial Advisory in MIFID I 
Investment advisory was mentioned in ISD which highlight the key role of client, defining 
investment recommendation as an activity that shall be made in the best interest of the client19. 
By the way, only with the adoption of Market in Financial Instruments Directive20 (MIFID) 
these duties about advisory activity acquired statutory force. MIFID replaced ISD since the last 
one wasn’t effective in the building of a solid legal framework. ISD tried consolidate the market 
with a minimum harmonization, while MIFID’ s approach is deeper and direct to harmonize 
the market with the goal to ensure investor’s protection and uniform competition. The failure 
of ISD was also due to the dynamics of financial market, implied by a growing complexity of 
securities and services.  
EU regulator introduced the renovation of European financial market through four separate 
moments21: 
1. MIFID I, Directive 2004/39/EC 
2. MIFID I, “Implementation act”, Directive 2006/73/EC 
3. Guidelines of CESR 
4. Periodic controls of EU Commission 
In the first moment EU Legislator defined general principle, on the opposite the implementation 
act takes care of specific situations that concern the regulation of investment firms and the 
implementation of transparency principle in the market. Guidelines settled by CESR are 
targeted to Member States, helping them in the convergence of the Directive. 
This reform process wasn’t oriented to regulate only financial advisory, but it contains also 
important elements that renovate the fields of intermediaries and trading venues in the European 
scenario. Anyway, the discipline of our interest is focused on financial advisory, and in specific 
way the advisory in the investment sector, which was modified by this directive. Investment 
                                                          
18 See section 1.3) Financial Transparency, page 24 
19 See Art.11, ISD 
20 Directive 2004/39/EC 
21 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content 
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advice is contained in Art. 4 of MIFID I22 and it is defined as: “the provision of personal 
recommendations to a client, either upon its request or at the initiative of the investment firm, 
in respect of one or more transactions relating to financial instruments”23. The main elements 
that design the new concept of investment advisory can be summarized in: 
 Personal nature of service 
 Centrality of Recommendation 
The aspect of personal recommendation summarizes very well the intention of legislator to 
connect the new definition to the previous principle of investor’s centrality described in ISD 
already. The personal aspect of recommendation is better specified in the “implementation act” 
of MIFID I, in fact, the service provided shall be suitable for the person. It is the main point, 
and it must be based on the consideration of the whole financial context of that person. The 
recommendation is not considered personal if it is provided exclusively through distribution 
channel or to the public24. 
At the same time MIFID introduces an important change for Intermediaries with a deeper 
orientation to advisory role.  In this definition is clear how legislator focused his attention over 
the service provided. This was a structural change respect to the previous regulation and it is 
relevant because it changes the logic of the activity. The role of advisor is designed no more to 
sell a security but to sell a service. Moreover, investment advisory is settled by MIFID as an 
activity subject to approval, so all the rules of transparency and fairness must be respected by 
all the advisors that carried out the activity, deleting unbounded consultant from the market. 
The requirement for authorization define that the provision of investment service shall be 
granted by the competent authority of Member States25. 
The legislator required some specific rules of conduct for intermediaries to respect in client’s 
relation: 
 The intermediaries shall notify to clients that the investment firm has to distinguish the 
types of clients in three categories: Retail investor, Professional investor and eligible 
counterparty in accordance with principles settled in MIFID. The investment firm has 
also to notify to clients any right to request a different categorization and consequent 
limitation of client protection26.  
                                                          
22 If not better specified as “Implementation act” it is referred to Directive 2004/39/CE 
23 Art. 4 Directive 2004/39/CE. 
24 Art. 52 Directive2006/73/EC. 
25 Art. 5 Directive 2004/39/CE 
26 Art. 28 Directive 2006/73/EC. 
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 Member states have to ensure that investment firms act in the best interest of the client, 
following the principles of honesty, fairness and professionalism. Moreover, it is 
forbidden provide an investment or ancillary service paying or being paid any fee, 
commission or non-monetary benefits. Inducements are approved only if it is designed 
to enhance the quality of the relevant service to the client, and not impair compliance 
with the best interest of the investor. The method of calculating of the fee or commission 
shall be disclosed to the client in a comprehensible manner27. 
 The investment form shall provide to the clients, also through a summary form, a 
description of the conflict of interest policy maintained by the firm28. 
 Best execution criteria design the execution of the order, made by investment firm, to 
obtain the best result for the client. This criterion implies for a retail client that the best 
possible result is represented by the price of financial instrument and the cost related to 
execution, which shall include all the expenses incurred by the client, which are directly 
related to order’s execution29. 
The assessment of suitability of the service required by the personal nature of the service 
described above is not let to the will of intermediaries but is well designed by the legislator in 
order to uniform the service. The Advisor has to understand the essential facts about the client 
in order to assess correctly the investment objective, financial capacity to bear investment risks 
and ability of the client to understand the risk. The information that needs to the advisor shall 
concern the financial situation such as the source of his income, his assets and others financial 
commitments. Are required to the clients also information about personal preference for the 
length of investment and previous experience in financial investment. 
This framework for the regulation of advisory activity include specific rules for investment 
advisory and other, like for example the distinction in different categories of client, that are 
referred to intermediaries in general. The rules designed by MIFID are oriented to the protection 
of client through transparency, to achieve the wider perspective of a stable and harmonized 
European Financial market. The deadline for the reception of MIFID in Member States was 
settled the November 1st, 2007. Anyway, the Financial Crisis and the subsequent Recession had 
a strong impact on financial market, forcing the legislator to apply further changes in the 
subsequent years. 
 
                                                          
27 Art. 26 Directive 2006/73/EC. 
28 Art. 30 Directive 2006/73/EC. 
29 Art. 44 Directive 2006/73/EC. 
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1.2.2. Impact of Financial Crisis 
MIFID I brought a lot of improvements in the European market, defining a common legislation 
aimed to stabilize the European Financial Market over a long period.  The scenario of financial 
market suffered a huge crisis, emerged in September 15 of 2008 with the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers. The crisis started a couple of years before the largest bankruptcy of US history, 
triggered by the system that built on subprime mortgages30. The impact wasn’t limited to 
financial sector, but it was extended also to the real estate market, hitting hard especially the 
retail investors. The crisis became systemic with the infection of sovereign debts all around the 
world. It is hard to find some credible data about the world impact of the crisis across the years 
after 2008, but probably no quantitative data can reflect the most important defeat of financial 
system, the loss of confidence of investors.  
Everything started in 2000, with the rise of new types of loans in the market, that constitutes 
the basic element of securitization31 process. These products were present on the market since 
1980s but they were not traded in a massive way. Loans were designed by Banks and granted 
by Banks and other intermediaries such as Independent brokers and non-depository institutions. 
Loans in USA market are not intended as European concept of mortgage, the differences are 
about the type of borrower and the repayment system. The categories of loan, besides 
mortgages, are huge and the description of some types is useful to understand that a subprime 
loan is not linked only to real-estate market32. An interesting type of loan is NINJA, that are 
referred to loans granted to borrower which has no job, no source of income and no assets, thus 
it can be considered an unsecured loan. Another type is the Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) 
which have a strange repayment structure, characterized by a negative amortization of the Loan. 
In firsts periods borrower pays an amount of money also lower than interest part, and after some 
periods he starts to pay the mortgage rate composed by capital part and interest part. In this way 
the mortgage is affordable by everyone for the first period but involves multi-dimensional 
issues as the possibility to change repayment system. For example, after a given period it shift 
from the fix interest rate of repayment to a variable interest rate. Loans with collaterals different 
from real-estate property were spread in the market such as Student loan, Payday loan, 
Automobile title loan and Tax refund anticipation loans. Loans secured by real-estate property 
                                                          
30“It is a loan with an high risk of default”, to deepen the argument: Y. DEMYANYK and O. VAN HEMERT 
Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, , The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 24, issue 6, June 
2011. 
31 Securitization is going to be described in this chapter, to deepen the topic: A.B. ASHCRAFT and T 
SCHUERMANN, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit; T. PIRSKOSKI, A. SERU, 
V. VIG, Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis, 2010, 
Journal of Financial Economics 
32 A. LUPOI, Circolazione e contrabbando del rischio nei subprime loan, 2015, Rivista di Diritto Bancario 7  
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were more suitable for the securitization process, but also other collateral were well accepted. 
A symbolic technique to produce more loans at the same time is known as “piggyback”, it 
consists in a double mortgage to cover the entire value of the real estate. The first mortgage 
covered the main percentage of the value, the second part was used to pay the residual part. 
The granting of a loan shall be based on a creditworthiness rating of borrower, known as FICO 
score. FICO is represented by a value, from 300 to 85033, and it is based on: 
 35% Payment History  
 30% Debt Amount 
 15% Credit History  
 10% New Credit Line 
 10% Credit Mix34 
A higher value defines better repayment capacity of the borrower thus a lower interest rate for 
the loan granted, this value is dynamic and can be updated after every missed payment of 
borrower. If Fico score of borrower is under the threshold of 500 the loan is considered 
subprime35. 
Predatory Lending 
The market of loans was controlled by intermediaries which lent money in the market in an 
indiscriminate way. The loans were not hold by lenders but was purchased by investment banks 
or vehicles which managed them through a securitization mechanism36. Since lenders were 
interested to gain more money through commissions, and the supply of loans were well 
supported the demand, intermediaries started to lent money in a non-discriminatory way. 
Intermediaries took the possibility to fraud borrower in order to grant more loans possible and 
they achieved this aim with a practice called Predatory Lending. There is not a fix definition of 
Predatory Lending, because it can be performed in different forms37. The lender which 
convinces in a deceptively way a borrower to accept unfair or abusive loan conditions is 
considered a predatory lender. Furthermore, it is considered predatory lending also the 
systematic violation of loans terms in ways that the borrower is unable to protect itself38. The 
                                                          
33 S. MEIER, C.D. SPRENGER, Time Discounting Predicts Creditworthiness, 2012, Psicological Science 23, 
page 57 
34 “Credit mix consider credit cards, credit accounts of retailer, installment loans, accounts in finance company 
and mortgage. It is not a main factor in the computation of FICO, but it assumes importance if others categories 
have not information”. Definition of my FICO. 
35 K. GERARDI, L. GOETTE, S. MEIER, Numerical ability predicts mortgage default, 2013, PNAS 
36 Described in this subsection, page 12 
37 S.I. FOODMAN, Predatory Lending and Mortgage Fraud, 2009, Banking L.J 126, page 254 
38 H. AMENT, Predatory Lending: What will stop it, 2012, Law and Financial Market Review 327. 
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matter is really complicated to define, but it is clear that is orientated to lend more loans possible 
in the market exploiting information asymmetries, abusing of borrowers. In fact, brokers and 
lenders have a wide knowledge of loan’s options and opportunities which allow them to take 
advantage of the borrowers. Favorite targets of a predatory lenders shall be persons with a poor 
financial education and owners of a real-estate property39. The loan provided with the practice 
of predatory lending is designed in such a way that borrowers are not going to afford the 
payment40 in long period, using types of product described above. 
The borrower that after some years is not able to repay the loan is convinced by brokers to 
borrow money again, regardless of suitability of loan with Fico score of borrower. The 
refinancing of a loan is called “flipping” and it was common in that years. This practice is 
incentivized by additional fees for the broker, but at the same time, through flipping the equity 
is removed from the loan and do not provide any benefit to borrower41. The lender through the 
practice of “packing” adds also different ancillary services to loans, as for example insurance, 
which are not required by the borrower. The whole “industry” is oriented to make loans that 
borrowers shall refinance with other loans. In long period borrowers are unable to pay back 
loans due to high costs due to a Fico score on subprime class, thus designated to foreclosure 
practice42. The predatory lending had tangible effect estimated in 9 billion dollars a year43 over 
borrower cost, and the number of subprime loans passed from 3% of loan in US during 2003 to 
8% in 2004. The impact can be appreciated in Table 244, which take in consideration the number 
of sub-prime loans with respect to all mortgages. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 A. LUPOI, Circolazione e contrabbando del rischio nei subprime loan, Rivista diritto bancario vol.7, page 7 
40 H. AMENT, Predatory Lending: What will stop it?, 2009, Journal of business & Technology Law , page 376 
41 A.B. FERGUSON, Predatory Lending: Practices, Remedies and Lack of Adequate Protection 
for Ohio Consumers, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607 
42 “Legal process by which a lender cancels (forecloses) a borrower's right of redemption of the mortgaged 
property through a court order, …, the lender is free to sell the property. The borrower remains liable for the due 
amount if the property remains unsold, and for the shortfall if the sale proceeds are insufficient to pay off the 
entire debt.” , Business Dictionary. 
43 K. EGGERT, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course 
Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 507 (2002) 
44 Table 1.1 S. I. FOODMAN, Predatory Lending and Mortgage Fraud, 2009, Banking Law Journal 254. 
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Table 1. 1: shows the increasing number of subprime mortgages in years before the crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By the way, low creditworthiness of creditors was amortized by an efficient real-estate market 
until 2006. The non-juridical procedure of foreclosure in US market allow the creditor to sell 
collateral in a relative short period, one year, with a capital recovery around 70% or 80%, in 
conditions of efficient market.45 Since demand of real-estate property was high the misleading 
behavior of lender was covered, and for long time predatory lending had real effects only on 
poor people which couldn’t afford their home. 
 
Securitization 
The predatory lending can be defined as a source of raw material for securitization mechanism. 
Securitization is a financial mechanism which integrates the market of loans, composed mainly 
by residential mortgages, with the capital markets46. The aim of this complex mechanism is to 
shift the mortgage risk on external investors, so risk of subprime mortgage is not suffered by 
the originator of loan but it is up to final investors.  Securitization process is composed by 
different parts well represented in Figure 1, the first part has been explained already under the 
description of predatory lending, and it referred to the placement of loan in the market. At this 
point the Bank has a credit right, ensured by a collateral on the balance sheet, that shall be 
remunerated by future cash flow. 
                                                          
45 M. BRENNAN, America’s New Foreclosure Capitals, Forbes, 2012, “average of 348 days at national level”, 
“(house) sell at a 24% of discount” 
46 K.C. ENGEL & P.A. McCOY, Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending,2007 
75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2039, 2043 
  All 
mortgages 
number 
serviced 
Prime Loans 
Conventional 
number 
serviced 
Sub-prime 
Loans 
number 
serviced 
% of Sub-
prime in the 
market 
Q3 2007 45.417.215 35.224.689 5.990.253 13% 
Q4 2006 43.481.826 33.322.667 5.971.363 14% 
Q4 2005 41.234.414 31.143.532 5.527.341 13% 
Q4 2004 39.306.561 29.255.227 4.852.040 12% 
Q4 2003 37.233.278 28.363.266 3.112.058 8% 
Q4 2002 33.798.985 26.009.913 1.293.132 4% 
Q4 2001 32.558.320 24.309.888 868.813 3% 
Q4 2000 30.510.925 22.195.265 808.339 3% 
Q4 1999 29.618.847 21.504.493 570.069 2% 
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Anyway, the bank can’t keep on balance sheet all the loans, since the remunerative activity is 
the intermediation, not the holding activity47. Holding of loans involves also a liquidity problem 
for banks besides problem of borrower’s creditworthiness. Banks, to shift the risk, transfer the 
loans to Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), the vehicle can be owned by the same owner of bank, 
but with a different legal entity. Loans acquired by SPV were packaged and classified in 
different tranches. The tranches created constitute the assets of SPV, that are called Asset 
Backed Securities (ABS) in this case. Since the majority of these layers contain residential 
mortgage were called Rental Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) which the SPV sold directly 
to investors or to another Vehicle that securitized them in Credit Default Obligation (CDO). At 
this stage the Vehicle manufacturer of CDO sell the products in the market to investors or to 
further steps of securitization process (another SPV), not represented in Figure 148.  
Figure 1. 1: Securitization process 
Tranches that design ABS in general are assessed on the risk of default of mortgages that 
construct the effective underling of asset. However, the number of mortgages with high rating 
                                                          
47 G. GORTON, A. METRICK, Securitized banking and the run on repo, 2012, Journal of Financial Economics 
104, page 431. 
48 G. GORTON, A. METRICK, Securitized Banking and the run on repo, 2012, Journal of Financial Economics 
104, p 431, figure 6 
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(AAA) was limited and vehicles stated to put low ratings loans (D)49 in assets that have mainly 
high rated tranches. These ABS were rated by external rating agencies as triple A even if in the 
assets were combined loans with higher risk and a spread around three percentage point50. This 
unfair process was implemented also for the further steps of securitization mechanism, bringing 
to the building of assets characterized by high rating and at the same time high risk of default 
of underling mortgages, categorized as Subprime51.  
Securitization process stated to be fraudulent with the provision of misleading information on 
the effective risk of the products. The opaque nature of the process is supported by the 
complexity of products, which is composed by different layers, facilitating the application of 
the fraud. Rating agencies assist the fraud allowing to intermediaries to obtain asset’s rating 
untied from the real risk of products. The structure collapse with the deterioration of real-estate 
market. The slowing of the house market was influenced by the higher number of foreclosures, 
which had a negative impact on the neighborhoods’ value52. The drop of demand ceases to 
sustain the financial system and thus the securitization process results unsecured. 
Figure 1. 253: Representation of increasing number of default in USA, cumulative percentage 
of default with foreclosure practice. 
The financial system betrayed investors and borrowers combining in the same scheme predatory 
lending and securitization. The intermediaries essentially exploit the low level of authorities’ 
                                                          
49 The scale can vary according to different ECAI, but the most common follows these standards, see Regulation 
2016/1800/EC for others kinds of ratings scale accepted in European Union.  
50 Y. DEMYANYK, O. VAN HEMERT, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2011, The Review of 
Financial Studies 24 
51 G. GORTON, A. METRICK, Securitized banking and the run on repo, 2012, Journal of Financial Economics 
104   
52 J.R CAGGIANO, T.G. FRANZEN, and L.M. HOWELL, Subprime Mortgage and Predatory Lending Law 
Developments,2008, The Business Lawyer, page 638 
53 K. GERARDI, L. GOETTE, S.MEIER, Numerical ability predicts mortgage default, 2013, PNAS, Figure 1 
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supervision and the lack of adequate legislation to sell worthless assets to investors. The 
complete absence of transparency, at different levels of the system, and the consequent 
impotence of clients to make an informed choice, brought financial market to the financial 
crisis.  
Events since 2007 revealed embarrassing blind spots in the pre-crisis understanding of the 
financial system by policymakers, and also by the academic community54. After the crisis took 
place a growing awareness that the price to pay for the mismanagement of moral hazard carried 
out by banking system, financial intermediaries and a weak response of public sector, was paid 
by retail investors55. The inevitable loss of confidence influenced the market also slowing down 
the process of economic upturn that the public sector tried to implement after the crisis, 
extending the recession period. The history of financial market taught us that every time, after 
a great recession the legislator modified the rules56, to avoid the recurrence of phenomenon. 
After G-20 of 2011 EU started a process of consolidation of banking sector with the creation of 
banking union; the aim was to stabilize the sector which was stressed by the crisis of sovereign 
debts. European Banking Union was designed on three pillars:  
 Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)57 
 Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)58 
 Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS)59 
The priority given to banking sector’s stabilization had negative effects on the confidence of 
retailer investors. The reform of banking system was implemented before the upgrade of 
investor protection since the banking crisis was a structural problem with higher risks connected 
and so legislator decided to give the priority to this reform. In this renovation was designed a 
practice called bail-in60 used by legislator to eliminate the connection between banks and states 
in case of banking failure. The aim of bail-in is to reduce moral hazard and to increase the 
fairness in the conduct of bank management. Anyway, this practice increases the risk to bear 
losses for the investors and depositors but in the long run protect the taxpayer of the interested 
                                                          
54 Financial Reform after the Crisis: An Early Assessment, Nicolas Vernon, 2012 
55 BOCUZZI, Gli assetti proprietari delle banche, 2010 
56 P. ROSSI, Il nuovo regime della consulenza finanziaria nella MiFID II: prime riflessioni, Amministrazione in 
Cammino, 2017 
57 EU Regulation n 1024/2013 
58 Directive 2014/59/EU and EU Regulation n 806/14 
59 Directive 2014/49/EU 
60 “An arrangement in which creditors of a failing financial institution are required to cancel some of its debts as 
part of a plan to save it from collapse”, Oxford Dictionaries. For Bail-in: Analyzing the Cumulative Impact of 
Regulatory Reform, Chapter 11: A critical evaluation of bail-in as a bank recapitalization mechanism, Charles 
Goodhart and Emilios Avgouleas, 2015 
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State61. In a scenario where investors were stressed already, this reform cause a further 
deterioration of trust between market and investors.  
Concurrently European institutions not limited their efforts for the renovation of banking 
system, but after strong critics received for the protection of retail investors due to blind spots 
emerged during the crisis, the EU Legislator decided to intervene one more time on the rules of 
financial market. The decision to review the recent MIFID I is imposed by the necessity to gain 
one more time the trust of investors, consumers and depositors. By the way, the lacks 
highlighted are not limited to trust of investor, but they include also the regulation of trading 
venues and the definition of securities, which with the raise of financial engineering are more 
complex. 
 
1.2.3. Renovation of Financial Advisory through MIFID II and MIFIR 
The aim of all operations after financial crisis was defined in 2009 by the report: “The high-
level group of financial supervision in the EU”62, that is mainly followed by EU Legislator. 
The report was direct to macro-objective such as the Structure of EU Authorities, the 
management of risks in the market and the regulation of deregulated sectors. After this report 
EU regulator started to modify not only MIFID, but also other aspect of financial market such 
as the control of rating63 agencies and rules about edge funds, private equity and funds64 
different from Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS)65. 
After the crisis, all the pressures described above bring to the revision of financial market 
structure settled some year before by MIFID I. A trilateral dialogue between EU Commission, 
EU Council an EU Parliament reach in January 2014 an agreement on the text of new Directive. 
The renovation is based on: 
• Market in Financial Instrument Directive II (MIFID II)66 
• Market in Financial Instrument Regulation (MIFIR)67 
The introduction of the new directive is not a revolution of EU financial market, but an 
implementation of the existing framework designed in MIFID I, introducing important news 
                                                          
61 Effect of bail-in on investors’trust market, Maurizio Mazzotta 
62 Reported by a group headed by Jacques de Larosière under mandate of EU Commission. 
63 Implemented already with Regulation 1060/2009 but fated to be modified. 
64 Modification of cited matters with Directive 2011/61/EU. 
65 Directive 2009/63/CE 
66 Directive 2014/65/EU 
67 Regulation n. 600/2014 
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aimed to strengthen market structure without distort markets’ dynamics. The presence of 
Regulation implies the necessity to set a combination of rules not exposed to potential changes 
of Member States, giving less degree of freedom for the objectives considered strategic by the 
legislator. Anyway, MIFID II and MIFIR are based on the implementation of the principle of 
transparency in the European financial market to ensure a better investor’s protection. The 
approach of legislator is based on the disclosure of aspects, about market and products, which 
are not clear or not easy to understand for the investor. European Parliament take the 
opportunity to set corrections in the market structure aimed to regulate also the spot light of 
previous rules. The main fields in which MIFID II and MIFIR operate are: 
1. Definition area of application 
2. Investor’s protection 
3. Regulation of market 
4. Regulation of raw material derivatives 
5. Relations with third countries 
The activity of Investment advisory is subject to further modification, even if it was one of the 
main object of MIFID I. The main news about the advisor activity introduced by MIFID II are 
discussed below. 
 
Certificate of competence 
After the introduction of an authorization for the activity of advisory in MIFID I, MIFID II 
wants to define also standards of knowledge for people that work as investment advisor. In 
detail, the Directive requires that all investment firms, which carry out the activity of investment 
advisory, shall demonstrate to Competent National authorities that persons, which provide 
investment advice or give information to investors about financial securities or correlated 
services in behalf of the investment firm, have necessary knowledge and competence68. Each 
Member State must publish the standards and criteria that shall be used for the assessment. By 
the way there is an optional exemption in MIFID II, in fact it is possible for the Member States 
to choose, a national regulation different from EU directive if are respected two criteria. It is 
applicable National rules if the person in question is not allowed: 
 To hold client securities or funds and to place himself in debt with his client  
                                                          
68 Art. 25 Directive 2014/65/EU 
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 To provide any investment service except the reception and transmission of orders in 
transferable securities and units in collective investment undertakings 69 
Advisory on independent basis 
MIFID II introduce the possibility to provide the service of investment advice on independent 
basis. The introduction of this possibility enforces all advisors to specify to the investor if the 
type of advisory is independent or not70, respecting the principle of transparency. If advisor is 
independent shall provide to client a supply of financial securities wider enough to diversify 
type of products and also issuers or product provider, in order to ensure the independent nature 
of the service provided71.  This rule allows to signal the absence of conflict of interest for the 
independent advisor and therefore investor’s choice is not limited to securities offered by a 
single issuer linked to advisor. The aim of legislator is to ensure a higher degree of suitability72 
of the product respect to investors preferences. The investment firm have the possibility for the 
first time to provide at the same time two types of advisory, independent and non-independent. 
In this last case the advisor is not totally independent because give to investment firm a 
percentage of the commission received by the client and the fee linked to financial product in 
portfolio issued by the investment form73. Client has to pay attention at this borderline situation 
that we can define “hybrid” advisory. Anyway, this service on independent basis can be 
considered also a Fee-based Advice because the advisor receives fees only from the customer 
and not from any other third party74. In table 275 is contained the new structure of incentives 
and information that shall be given to the client about it. 
The quality of investment advisory is diversified with the new incentive scheme, but until there 
is a commission-based advice there is not full protection from conflict of interest of advisor. 
After the ban on receiving commission the independent advisor increases the amount of fees. 
The remuneration of an independent advisor is about €150-350 per hour, in a small investor 
perspective do not make sense to choose this type of advisor, unless he wants to invest an 
                                                          
69 Art 3 Directive 2014/65/EU 
70 Art 24 Directive 2014/65/EU 
71 Art 24 Directive 2014/65/EU 
72 See page 27 
73 P. ROSSI, Il nuovo regime della consulenza finanziaria nella MiFID II: prime riflessioni, Amministrazione in 
Cammino, 2017 
74 T MJ MOLLERS, European Legislative Practice 2.0: Dynamic Harmonization of Capital Markets Law — 
MiFID II and PRIIP, SSRN. 
75Table taken and translated by: M. SCOLARI, MiFid2 and the new rules on inducements in financial services, 
BANCARIA 6, 2015. 
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important sum of money 76. The independent base advisory is an important new, but it seems 
that a large part of the population is excluded given the high commission to pay. 
Table 1. 2: Classification of incentives, it shows different incentives for different types of clients. 
Classification of incentives and information to clients77  
 MIFID II Information to clients 
Monetary Incentives   
Advisor on Independent 
Basis 
Prohibition of receiving 
and holding 
Reporting Fees on individual basis 
Advisor non-Independent Acceptable (to increase 
quality of service) 
Ex-ante detailed, Ex-post detailed and 
on individual basis 
Non-Monetary Incentives   
Advisor on Independent 
Basis 
Prohibition  
Advisor non-independent Acceptable (to increase 
quality of service) 
Ex-ante detailed, Ex-post detailed and 
on individual basis 
Non-Monetary Incentives 
of mild amount 
  
Advisor on Independent 
Basis 
Acceptable  Ex-ante, generic 
Advisor non-independent Acceptable (to increase 
quality of service) 
Ex-ante, generic 
 
Execution only and Best execution 
The execution only is the possibility for the investment firm to execute only the transmission 
or the reception of client’s order. This service is used by private person that has not a direct 
access to the market and so they need a service provider. Investment firm have to specify if the 
access to the venue is direct or indirect, and the only responsibility of the firm is the time that 
need to execute the transaction. In regime of execution only investment firm does not provide 
any type of judgement. The principle of Execution only complements the principle of Best 
execution, present in MIFID already. In MIFID II Best execution principle is recalled and it 
design that the execution policy shall be clear for the investor and shall be provided information 
about how orders will be executed by the intermediary for the client. Investment firm shall also 
provide for free information about price, costs, speed of execution for every security78. 
Moreover, shall be required information about the top five execution venues on annual basis, 
classified for financial instrument and trading volumes79. 
                                                          
76  T MJ MOLLERS, European Legislative Practice 2.0: Dynamic Harmonization of Capital Markets Law 
MiFID II and PRIIP, SSRN 
77 M. SCOLARI, MiFid2 and the new rules on inducements in financial services, BANCARIA 6, 2015, page 57 
78 Art 27 Directive 2014/65/EU 
79 Art 27 Directive 2014/65/EU 
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Furthermore, MIFID II provide important principles of conduct for the provider of investment 
services, which were partially defined in MIFID already. The general principle of conduct 
requires that the provider of an investment service act fairly, honestly and professionally in 
accordance with the best interest of client80 and complying with principles of suitability and 
appropriateness81. The legislator set this principle to design a behavior for which the advisor 
not only complains with the law but also helps the law to fulfill its ratio. In fact, there are a lot 
of behavior that are legal but potentially unfair. For example, an intermediary could not specify 
the different importance of signatures in the contract, because it is not obligated, but this 
behavior do not comply with the general principle of conduct, since it is not oriented to 
investor’s protection. The best interest of the client assumes priority with respect to the interest 
of intermediary. This imply that the financial instrument shall meet the needs of target 
investor82, matching client profile of risk. This objective is an old target of legislator, settled in 
ISD the first time, but not yet achieved with MIFID. By the way, the advisor needs information 
to create the risk profile of investor and at the same time has to provide information about 
securities to the client. MIFID II settled appropriate instrument to make possible this exchange 
of information between advisor and investor. The principle of transparency assumes a main role 
in MIFID II. The Advisor shall ensure more information about the security to the client and at 
the same time investors have to be more transparent with advisor to receive a more suitable 
advice. 
 
1.3. Financial Transparency 
Transparency is the main topic concerning the client protection, since, as described previously, 
it plays an important role in the disclosure of the hidden aspect of the financial market. In 
section 1.2.2 is analyzed the way in which the financial crisis hit the market. The complete 
absence of transparency has supported the fraud of financial system towards the investors. By 
the way transparency is ever been one of the main objective of European legislator, it was cited 
in Financial Market Action Plan of 1999, in ISD and also in MIFID but every attempt to 
establish a lasting legislation failed or was amended. Financial transparency is characterized by 
the accessibility and visibility of information concerning business83which shall disclose the 
aspect of interest. Information have to be provided to investors with the correct timing, the 
European legislator; in fact, specify that the investor or the potential investor shall be informed 
                                                          
80 Art 24 Directive 2014/65/EU 
81 Art 25 Directive 2014/65/EU 
82 Art 24 Directive 2014/65/EU 
83 Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
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in “good” time before the provision of the service84. At the same time provider of the service 
has not to hide information in active way, being honest with respect to investors. The 
implementation of the general principle of transparency aims at clients’ protection through the 
correct conduct of intermediaries. The legislator is so focused on the provision of useful 
information to investors to fill the informative gap between advisor and investors that in the 
recent history has designed an unbalanced relation. Transparency is not linked only to financial 
performances of product but involves the aspects that concern the investment. Information are 
the cornerstone of financial market and so the implementation of transparency principle was 
pursued not only to protect investors but also to design a more efficient market. Financial 
analysts all over the world take investment decision based on information available, but in 
complete absence of information also a person that have a high financial education is unable to 
take a choice85. The provision of information is the only way in which the legislator helps the 
investor because do not influence the free will of investors but at the same time give the 
instruments to take a better decision since it is based on reliable information. The 
implementation of transparency regime through disclosure tools shall be designed to provide a 
tangible improvement to the investors’ decision making and this aspect is not obvious for the 
legislator. Thus, the main concern of the authority is to design a single layer of information that 
could be reliable for different kinds of investors present in the market. The higher barrier to 
reach this goal is represented by the capacity of different investors, with different level of 
financial education, to understand and exploit data in order to achieve the best choice in relation 
to preferences. 
In order to solve this issue in MIFID I the legislator define different types of client, and the 
main distinction is between Professional and Retail client. This differentiation is recalled by 
MIFID II that is actually in force and recognize as professional those clients with a level of 
market knowledge and experience appropriate to make a personal evaluation of the risk and a 
consequent own investment decision86. There is a list of entities that shall be regarded as 
professional; it includes: entities which have to be authorized or regulated to operate in the 
financial market87, national and regional governments, institutional investors whose the main 
                                                          
84 Art 24 MIFID 
85 C. MALLIN Editorial, The Relationship between corporate governance transparency and financial disclosure, 
2002, Corporate Governance: an international review V 10 
86 ANNEX II, (II), MIFID II 
87 (a)Credit institutions, (b)Investment firms; (c) Other authorized or regulated financial institutions; (d) 
Insurance companies; (e) Collective investment schemes and management companies of such schemes; (f) 
Pension funds and management companies of such funds; (g) Commodity and commodity derivatives dealers; 
(h) Locals; (i) Other institutional investors. 
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activity is investing in financial securities and companies, which match two of the following 
requirement: 
 Own Funds € 2.000.000 
 Net Turnover € 40.000.000 
 Balance Sheet total € 20.000.000 
The client categorized as professional has a lower degree of protection since it is considered 
completely able to assess the risk of the investment. However also for professional clients there 
is the possibility to ask for a higher level of protection. Before the provision of the service the 
investment firm must inform the clients that is classified as professional on the basis of available 
information. The client, that must be informed by bank about the possibility to obtain a higher 
degree of protection, is considered responsible to ask a different treatment if it deems to not be 
able to act as a professional client. 
The retail client is defined by process of elimination, so all the agents or individuals which are 
not recognized as professional are retailer. Anyway, a retailer can ask to be recognized as 
professional client to gain more kind of transaction available by sacrificing the higher 
protection. A simple request is not enough, the bank shall make a serious assessment on 
quantitative and qualitative aspect. The assessment is based on the comply with the two over 
the three subsequent criteria88: 
 Transaction frequency; 10 transactions of average for each quarter in last four quarter. 
 Financial instrument portfolio, cash and financial instrument, € 500.000. 
 Client works or has worked in financial sector for at least one year.  
The advisor shall communicate to the client that want to shift from retail to professional the 
differences in the treatment before the decision of the investor. This important distinction 
between different types of clients, identifies the investors who need more protection.  
The transparency regime is implemented especially in pre-trading activity, since it is the 
moment in which the investors needs information to take the investment decision. EU legislator 
settled two main principle of conduct to design a more transparent environment: 
Appropriateness and Suitability.  
 
 
                                                          
88 ANNEX II, (II), 1, MIFID II 
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Appropriateness 
The principle of appropriateness shall be applied for services different from portfolio 
management89 and investment advice; the investment firm shall ask to client information 
concern the experience and the knowledge about the specific product or service that is object 
of the operation. In response to the information collected by the client the investment firm shall 
evaluate the appropriateness of product or service90 provided. If it does not result appropriate 
for client or potential client, the investor shall be made aware about inappropriateness. Clients 
could also refuse to provide the necessary information for the evaluation of appropriateness, in 
this case the investment firm have to warn the investor about the impossibility to perform an 
evaluation. By the way, this principle is not binding for the client. Whether the bank aware the 
investor about the mismatch with the principle of appropriateness, but the client has the will to 
proceed with the operation the bank can proceed. The application of this principle requires a 
low level of information, it is applied in case of reception and transmission of orders and the 
execution of order in behalf of the client91. 
 
Suitability 
The criterion of suitability is referred to activity of portfolio management and investment 
advice, in these cases the influence of advisor over the investment decision is more relevant 
because the investment firm shall suggest an investment option for the client. The nature of the 
service is different from appropriateness. The advisor shall not execute an investment decision 
took already by the client, but it has to provide a personal recommendation for the specific 
needs of the client92. In order to respect the principle of suitability the investment firm shall 
collect all the information about the experience and knowledge of investor in financial market, 
in line with the appropriateness, and further information about the financial situation: 
 Investment objective 
 Ability to bear losses 
 Risk tolerance 93 
                                                          
89 “Means managing portfolios in accordance with mandates given by clients on a discretionary client-by-client 
basis where such portfolios include one or more financial instruments”, Art 4 MIFID II,   
90 Art 25 (3), MIFID II 
91 “act to conclude agreements for one or more securities in behalf of the client” Art 4, (5), MIFID II. 
92 Art 4, MIFID  
93 Art 54 (2) Regulation 2017/565/EU 
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The principle of suitability required more specific information because it aims to define the risk 
profile of the investor, that is a pillar to obtain a perfect match between personal 
recommendation of advisor and personal needs of client. This principle represents the centrality 
of the client in investment advisory. The essence of activity is the determination of client’s 
profile, that shall be matched by the investment strategy recommended by advisor.  
The EU legislator to guarantee the protection of retail client set the general principle of 
conduct94 to define the centrality of the client and designing the behavior and standards of 
transparency that the advisor has to respect. Defining the principle of appropriateness, and in 
particular the principle of suitability the regulator establishes the way in which the objective 
shall be achieved. The complementarity of Art 24 and Art 25 of MIFID II is totally oriented to 
ensure to investor the most transparent situation. MIFID II design a double flow of information, 
first consolidate the flow from advisor to investor to guarantee a fair and honest description of 
the financial instrument. Secondly from investor to advisor in order to allow the investment 
firm to assess the risk profile of investor, fulfilling the suitability principle. With the purposes 
to applicate these principles are settled important instrument for the information collection and 
for the information provision. 
 
1.3.1. Context of Application 
Prospectus 
The implementation of transparency principle in the market is not started with MIFID II but it 
was an objective pursued also by rules that anticipate this last Directive. The protection of the 
client was structured at European level for the first time through the Prospectus95 , a disclosure 
document, defined in Directive 2003/71/EU. Prospectus is not an obsolete instrument since the 
directive, which define it, is still in force even if it’s settled fifteen years ago. This document is 
the first answer of legislator to asymmetric information problem between advisor and client and 
it contains a huge amount of information. Prospectus is aimed to provide information that the 
client should uses to assess the investment in a fully informed way. Furthermore, the 
information shall be presented in an easily analyzable and comprehensible way, in order to 
allow to investor with a low level of financial education to understand the data. Prospectus is 
not designed only for the investors protection, in fact the admission of a security to trading 
activity is linked by the publication of prospectus in all regulated market situated or operating 
                                                          
94  See at p.24 
95  See page 9 
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inside European Union96. Prospectus is a document with a validity of twelve months from the 
publication but only if it is complete of all supplements required. Validity depends also by kind 
of prospectus, whether it is composed by separate documents, the validity of the document 
follows other rules. The documents that composed prospectus are97: 
 Registration document 
 Securities note 
 Summary note 
These documents contain all information about issuer, characteristics of securities, essential 
risk and they shall be written in comprehensible language. In this situation all the documents 
shall be updated every 12 months, if one of the documents needs an update but it is not updated 
the prospectus can be considered not valid. The updating of prospectus is not limited to the 
annual validity, but it shall be modified every time that a new factor, an inaccuracy of 
information and a material mistake included in a prospectus or in a single part of it can affect 
securities’ assessment.  
The approval of Prospectus is managed through the principle of home State Control. The home 
Member State is always the state in which the issuer has its registered office, and so the 
competent authority for the approval and update of security98. This means that issuers of 
securities shall always apply the authorization of prospectus at the competent authority of the 
state in which registered office is situated.  Without approval prospectus can’t be published, 
and so also the security can’t be sold in the regulated market. After the approbation the 
document shall be filed and made available to the public99, this operation shall be made in good 
time respect to the effective offer of the security. The availability of prospectus is provided 
through the publication in one of the channels settled by legislator. It can be considered 
available to the public if it is published in one or more newspapers with a wide circulation in 
the Member States100, where the offer is available to the public or it is admitted to trading. Also, 
the printed form is considered a tool of publication and can be available or in issuer’s office or 
in the office of the market in which the security is admitted101, free of any charge. The last 
publication form available is the electronic one102 and can be published on the websites of 
issuer, regulated market in which is admitted or competent authority of member state. 
                                                          
96 Art 3 Directive 2003/71/EU 
97 Art 5 (3) Directive 2003/71/EU 
98 Art 13 Directive 2003/71/EU 
99 Art 14 Directive 2003/71/EU 
100 Art 14 (2) (a) Directive 2003/71/EU 
101 Art 14 (2) (b) Directive 2003/71/EU 
102 Art 14 (2) (c) (d) (e) Directive 2003/71/EU 
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Prospectus shall be written in a language considered acceptable by the home member state. The 
offer to the public or admission and the main points that shall contains103 are: 
 Identity of directors, senior management, advisers and auditors 
 Key information about the issuer 
 Information on the company 
 Operating and financial review and prospects 
 Directors, senior management and employees 
 Major shareholders and related-party transactions 
 Financial information 
 Additional information104 
Directive 2003/71/EC modernized and harmonized disclosure requirements helping to create a 
financial market more uniform across Member States. The essential improvement is given by 
the creation of a document that constitute a sort of passport for primary market activities. This 
huge amount of information could not be suitable for the investors’ assessment because the 
amount of information is not always directly proportional to the comprehension105 of financial 
products. 
 
Questionnaire 
The principles of appropriateness and suitability defined in MIFID I and recalled in MIFID II 
open a new mandatory channel of information’s exchange between client and intermediary. The 
information collected from the investor are important before the subscription, during the 
contract and after the end of the contract to define and match the profile of investor. The 
information required by MIFID II shall be obtained but is not better specified the way in which 
investment firm must fulfill this duty. The assessment of appropriateness can be defined as a 
sub-case of the suitability since that knowledge and experience, that are field of investigation 
of appropriateness are included in the information required for the assessment of suitability. 
The set of data required by suitability questionnaire is wider because the investigation field is 
not limited to general knowledge and experience, that are useful to assess the investor’s capacity 
to tolerate risk. In fact, investor has to provide information also about the financial capacity to 
bear losses and the objective of investment activity. Another main difference between 
suitability and appropriateness questionnaire is that the first is compulsory for the performance 
                                                          
103 Annex I Directive 2003/71/EU 
104 See Appendix 3 to have an idea of the amount of information contained in Prospectus. 
105 K. L. KELLER; R. STAELIN, effects of quality and quality of information on decision effectiveness, 1987 
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of the activity. However, the directive does not lay down further rules over the general 
principles settled in Art 24 and 25 of MIFID II. The specific content or layout of questionnaire 
is not defined by legislator and each advisor is the manufacturer of own questionnaire. The lack 
of standardization let large degree of freedom to the investment firm that shall design the 
questionnaire to satisfy the general requirement, but it has not tight limit to observes. Different 
investment firm can determine different questionnaire for clients with respect to competitors106. 
This aspect could represent a limit for the protection of clients because the result of the 
questionnaire determines the risk profile of client that is the main measure for the application 
of suitability principle. In fact, the main risk for this system is to obtain different results from 
different questionnaire filled by the same investor. Anyway, general guidelines of MIFID are 
integrated through the regulation 2017/565/EU which define more detailed information that 
shall be contained in questionnaire107:  
Investment objective  Preference over length of investment 
 Preference about risk taking 
 Purpose of investment 
 
Ability to bear losses  Source of regular income 
 Investment, real-estate property and assets 
 Financial commitments 
 
Risk tolerance    Volume, length and frequency of previous transaction 
 Previous experience with financial services 
 Profession and level of education 
 
The number of question to disclose these information is not defined, in Italy there are 
questionnaire with a minimum of 9 and a maximum of 36 question, and an investigation 
performed108 shows that only one case over fourteen satisfy completely the principles defined 
in MIFID II109. The interpretation of directive plays a crucial role; thus, banks could be focused 
on an aspect emphasizing for example the source of income and neglecting the portfolio 
                                                          
106 Determined by the lack of further information in legislation. 
107 Art 54, Art 55 Regulation 2017/565/EU 
108 N. MARINELLI, C. MAZZOLI, Profiling investors with the MiFID: current practice and future prospects, 
Research paper. 
109 N. MARINELLI, C. MAZZOLI, Profiling investors with the MiFID: current practice and future prospects, 
Research paper. 
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composition of the client for example. The competence of front office influences the 
questionnaire since it is the reference point in communication between bank and client. 
Moreover, questionnaire is influenced also by the type of bank that draw it up, the commercial 
bank has a lot of differences with respect to investment bank which influence the goal of the 
questionnaire. In fact, a different category of securities and client define different orientations 
for the bank. Differences between questionnaires are also due to the existence of questionnaire 
for client before MIFID II, so bank carry out the previous format also after the introduction of 
directive. The miss alignment with the directive produce a diversification among questionnaire 
that produce a negative effect over investors, difficult to estimate. The introduction of the 
mandatory questionnaire is an important step from the legislative point of view in the field of 
client protection. Anyway, the lack of standardization and the large degree of freedom lets to 
bank the possibility to customize the questionnaires and thus also results. In conclusion there is 
risk that the final results are not uniform in the market and since client profile has a crucial role 
in protection, advisors have potentially rooms to influence the result of questionnaire, and thus 
the risk of investment.  
 
Impacts of Behavioral Finance over MIFID Questionnaire 
The process which define the risk profile of client can be influenced by different aspects, but 
the main impact is due to irrational behavior of agents; it is based on observation of individual’s 
choices which violate the hypothesis of rational behavior110. This discipline investigates how 
in certain cases individuals are unable to understand the available information and it highlights 
that in uncertainty conditions individuals act following approximate rules, called heuristic. 
Individuals’ behavior under uncertainty can be classified in three different sections: familiarity, 
representativeness and anchoring. Essentially, under uncertainty, preferences are not stable and 
so they can change in different context. This aspect is relevant for my purpose since it describes 
a misalignment between objective risk, perceived by rational individual, and relative risk, 
perceived by individual under uncertainty. In this kind of condition, the environment plays an 
important role influencing individuals. The misalignment is due to the overestimation or 
underestimation of probability associated to a given situation or event111. An immediate 
example which link financial behavior and MIFID questionnaire is the phenomenon of 
overconfidence. In questionnaire some questions are about the self-evaluation of client’s ability 
                                                          
110N. LINCIANO, la consulenza finanziaria tra errori di comportamento e conflitti d’ interesse, 2012, ANALISI 
GIURIDICA DELL’ ECONOMIA 
111 N. LINCIANO, P. SOCCORSO, La rilevazione della tolleranza al rischio degli investitori attraverso il 
questionario, CONSOB discussion paper, 2012, p.10 
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to understand the risk of a financial product. The individual assesses own ability with a higher 
rate respect to the effective ability since he is incentivized to evaluate himself over the perceived 
average of the sample112. The evaluation of risk is influenced also by the source of income that 
is object of investment; in fact, whether the source is a gain derived from other investment or a 
cash winning the risk perceived is lower113. A similar modification of risk perceived can be 
influenced by the final objective of investment because if it is aimed to recover a previous loss 
the risk perceived is lower by the investors114. Also, the intertemporal factor is influenced by 
the amount of money invested, an individual under uncertainty shall estimates a stable discount 
factor but inverse with respect to amount of the investment. Thus, the evaluations of client are 
distorted by multiple emotional factors and environmental conditions. These distortions are 
computed and investigated through two types of tools, economic tools based on quantitative 
analysis and psychological tools. These biases have a strong impact on evaluation of risk profile 
of client, undermining the correct estimation of risk tolerance. Whether risk profile is wrong 
the whole process of suitability is affected by the uncorrected estimation and the match with 
the risk of product shall not satisfy the real needs of the client.  
The source of bias is not limited to client’s perception of risk but also by the structure of 
questionnaire. The absence of a standardized questionnaire and the presence of wrong question 
structure respect to literature’s findings increase the possibility of an incorrect estimation. For 
example, risk tolerance is a composite measure, but some questionnaire investigates different 
factors115, which influence this measure, with a unique question, ruining the measurement. 
These problems are translated in non-uniform questionnaire across different advisors, thus as 
demonstrate by a survey carried out by Autoritè des marches financiers (AMF) over 1500 
individuals116. 
ESMA in 2011 issues further guidelines117 to correct the pattern highlighted in the section 
above, it reiterates the aim of questionnaire stressing the point of client’s centrality. It is the 
                                                          
112 The same example could be taken for individual which underestimate their ability under the average of the 
sample. 
113 This phenomenon is known as “House money effect”, described in a deeply way in: R.H. THALER, E. J. 
JOHNSON, Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky 
Choice, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, p 643 
114 “On the contrary if there is the risk to close under the break-even point the risk perceived is higher by the 
investors”, J. GRABLE, R.H. LYTTON, Financial risk tolerance revisited: the development of a risk assessment 
instrument, FINANCIAL SERVICE REVIEW, 1999, p 171 
115 The literature suggests that a financial risk-tolerance assessment instrument must include at least five 
elements: 1) some central concept of risk, 2) allowance for the derivation of risk measure, 3) relevance to 
respondents, 4) ease of administration, and 5) adequate validity and reliability, K. R. MAC CRIMMON, D.A. 
WEHRUNG, Assessing Risk Propensity, 1986 THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY. 
116 See page 30  
117 Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID suitability requirements, Dicembre 2011, Esma/ 
2011/445 
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answer to the critics highlighted by various investigation of supervisors which describes the 
inappropriateness of questionnaire. ESMA guidelines shall help the client to understand the 
importance of information in the design process of risk profiling and at the same time define 
that the client shall only provide information and do not decide his or her level of suitability, in 
fact it is a role of the intermediaries. At the same time a CONSOB’s118 interview asked to Italian 
intermediaries if the questionnaires are designed by expert in the fields of economy, psychology 
and statistics. Moreover, asked whether the questionnaire was tested with a sample or not. The 
results of this interview highlighted that the largest part of questionnaire in Italy are in line with 
the principles defined in MIFID, by the way the variables investigated are only a sub-section 
with respect to the variables suggested behavioral finance. 
 
Key Investor Information Document 
The legislator settled two important documents, prospectus to provide information to client and 
questionnaire to collect information necessary to define the risk profile of investor. However, 
the complexity and the huge dimension of prospectus does not allow to link in a direct way the 
information contained in the disclosure document and the risk profile defined by questionnaire. 
The synthetic output of questionnaire requires a suitable measure of risk to compare security 
profile and client needs. Directive 2009/65/EU design a new tool to investors119 aimed at 
providing only crucial information to investors120. Investment company shall draw up a 
document which contain key information121 useful for assessment of investor in the UCITS. A 
general definition of UCITS can be useful to understand the niche of products that shall be 
supported by KIID. UCITS are polled form of investment122 managed by the manager of fund 
that collect money in the market. The document shall be written in briefly way with a non-
technical language, in such a way that retail investor has not obstacles to comprehension123, in 
fact the comprehension of client shall be facilitated avoiding the use of technical terms if a 
“everyday”124 words can substitute it. Information provided shall be summarized in no more 
than two pages of A-4 size in printed form125. The ratio of legislator is to provide a more direct 
                                                          
118 National Commission in matter of society and exchange, (commissione nazionale per società e borsa) 
119 Implemented by Regulation583/2010 that define technical standards 
120 Art 78 (2) Directive 2009/65/EU 
121 Art 78 (1) Directive 2009/65/EU 
122 P.J. PAUL, The European Community's UCITS Directive: One Model for United States Regulatory Change in 
a Globalized Securities Market, 25 Vand. J.Transnat'l L. 61 (1992) 
123 Art 78 (5) Directive 2009/65/EU  
124 Art 5 (1) (b) (III) Regulation 583/2010 
125 Art 6 Regulation 583/2010 
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communication of information respect to prospectus, that is a huge document that in some cases 
has an important length126. The information summarized in KIID shall be127: 
 Identification of UCITS 
 Objective and policy of Investment 
 Performance, past and future scenario 
 Charges and cost  
 Risk profile and associated return of investment 
The application of Key Investor Information Document shall be laid down by manufacturer of 
the product but is the advisor that have to present it to client in order to respect the general 
principle of conduct. The directive entered in force from 1 July 2011. 
The introduction of KIID for a niche of products, paved the way for another important 
disclosure document, the Key Information Document (KID)128. It is a disclosure document 
based on the general principle of KIID but that cover a wider range of product called Packaged 
Retail and Insurance-based Investment Products (PRIIPs) and is going to be explained in deeply 
way in chapter 3. The framework applied by EU to ensure a transparent financial market is 
based on three pillars. Prospectus needs to guarantee a huge quantity of information which can 
be used by investor for a deep analysis of the instrument, and at the same time ensure a unique 
passport for the securities traded in EU financial market. The second level of documentation 
available for the investor is represented by KIID and KID, oriented to provide a synthetic in 
immediate information about the essential aspect of securities. The last tool is questionnaire use 
by Advisor to assess the profile of investor. The structure is designed to highlight the risk of 
securities and the risk’s profile of the investor, in this way the suitability of operations is 
understandable in an easy way, looking at the match between them, even if the products traded 
are complex. This new system aimed to protection of investors required a higher amount of 
information to advisor and manufacturer as to investors, which imply higher costs for 
intermediaries and higher risk in term of consumer’s privacy129. 
 
                                                          
126 See Appendix 3 
127 Art 78 (3) Directive 2009/65/EU 
128 Regulation 1286/2014/EU supplemented by Regulation 2017/653/EU that design technical standards 
129 M. Janssen, J. VAN DEN HOVEN, Big and Open Linked Data (BOLD) in government: A challenge to 
transparency and privacy? 2015 , Government information quarterly 32, page 363 
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1.4. Impact of MIFID and MIFID II in Italy 
The adjustment of national legislation, aimed to adopt MIFID, was implemented at three 
different level of national regulation. The legislative decree n. 164 in 2007 modified TUF130, 
the improvement of Intermediaries’ Regulation and Market’s Regulation performed by 
CONSOB and the elimination of Regulation about organization and procedures of 
intermediaries which conduct investment service or collective management of savings131 
operated by CONSOB. 
The implementation of MIFID presents some differences with the rules settled by European 
legislator. With regard to the opportunity for persons to perform investment advice the National 
legislator didn’t provide any adjustment until the modification in 2009132, which implement this 
possibility in line with MIFID. In the field of “financial promoter”133, the Italian regulation 
didn’t allow to manage funds or securities on behalf of investment firm’s client, in contrast with 
the European Directive that allow this kind of mansion. In Italy the activity of financial advisor 
was allowed only to dependent of Banks and Investment firms. The other content of MIFID are 
implemented in line with the ratio of EU Regulator. One of the most important point of 
implementation about financial advisory is the article 18 of TUF in which is defined the 
financial advisor and the constitution of a register for persons that operate as financial advisor. 
The persons shall respect standards of professionalism, independence and capital134.  
Another modification of TUF occurred with the reception of MIFID II in 2016 through 
deliberation of CONSOB n. 19548 which impact especially on Intermediaries’ Regulation, 
Issuers’ Regulation and Advisor’s Regulation. The implementation of a certificate of 
competence135for financial advisor is contained in Art 6 of TUF. The figure of independent 
advisor136 was defined by Italian legislator as “autonomous” advisor, and the new rules about 
incentives was adopted in line with MIFID II with two regulations of M.E.F.137. The others 
important modification about independent advisors are well integrated in national law with the 
Advisor’s Regulation at art. 17. The general reception of MIFID II has less discrepancies with 
                                                          
130 It is the text of dispositions in matter of Financial intermediation, Legislative Decree n. 58/1998 TUF  
131 Operation of CONSOB in accordance with Bank of Italy. 
132 Art 18 (ter) TUF 
133 Art 31 comma 2 TUF 
134 Art 18 (bis) (ter) TUF 
135 Described at p, 17 section Certificate of competence 
136 See sub-section “advisor on independent basis” p 22 
137 Decree of Economic Ministry n. 206/2008 denominated “Regolamento di disciplina dei requisiti di 
professionalità,onorabilità, indipendenza e patrimoniali per l'iscrizione all'albo delle persone fisiche consulenti 
finanziari” and  Decree of Economic Ministryn. 66/2012 denominated “Regolamento di disciplina dei requisiti 
patrimoniali e di indipendenza delle società di consulenza finanziaria”. 
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respect to reception of MIFID I, an important role is played by the presence of more regulation 
in the second directive which imply a more rigid application of rules defined by EU Regulator.
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2. Packaged Retail Insurance –Based Investment Products 
At our days’ investment market scenario is rich of products structured in a complex way, that 
usually are not easy to understand for clients. A lot of banks offer products to retail investors, 
even if these subjects are not able to realize in which way their money are invested and 
consequently, the real risk of the investment. The core of this products is represented by 
packaged retail insurance-based investment products, otherwise identified with the acronym 
“PRIIP”. There is not a specific definition or a rigid legal form which defines PRIIPs, but this 
class of product is established with process of elimination. 
The main characteristic which define a PRIIP is the nature of the repayable amount which is 
subject to fluctuation linked to performances of one or more assets exposed to reference values, 
not directly purchased by retail investors138. Another characteristic, that could be also infer by 
the name, is the “packaged” nature of the product that is built through a sort of wrapping 
mechanism. This mechanism may have different nature such as pools of capitals, reference rates 
or use of derivatives. It basically allows to the manufacturer of the products to combine multiple 
assets exposures, obtain ad hoc costs structure or design unique product features. The aspect 
that concerns to “insurance-base” is referred to insurance product linked totally or partially to 
market fluctuation and they contain capital guarantees or insurance of other nature, linked to an 
investment operation. Products shall be considered PRIIP even if they are not packaged, is 
enough that the maturity or renunciation value is linked to fluctuation of the market, in this case 
the product is classified as an Insurance-based investment product139. On the other side another 
sub-category of PRIIP are PRIP and so “packaged retail investment product”, which do not 
include insurance-based products but are composed by products issued by SPV140 or 
securitization special purpose entities141, and they respect the main characteristic of PRIIPs. 
This category of instrument is oriented to perform better than risk-free rate in a medium or long- 
term investment horizon.  
 
                                                          
138 Recital 6, Regulation 1286/2014 
139 Art 4 (2), Regulation 1286/2014 
140 Definition: ‘special purpose vehicle’ means any undertaking, whether incorporated or not, other than an 
existing insurance or reinsurance undertaking, which assumes risks from insurance or reinsurance undertakings 
and which fully funds its exposure to such risks through the proceeds of a debt issuance or any other financing 
mechanism where the repayment rights of the providers of such debt or financing mechanism are subordinated to 
the reinsurance obligations of such an undertaking. Art 13 (26) DIRECTIVE 2009/138/EC 
141 Definition: securitisation special purpose entities’ means entities whose sole purpose is to carry on a 
securitisation or securitisations. Art 4 (an) Directive 2011/61/EU  
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The category of PRIIPs do not include: 
• Non-life insurance products142 
• Life insurance with benefit payable only on death, sickness or injury. 
• Non- structured deposits  
• Securities143  
• Pension product with primary purpose of providing retirement income 
• Occupational pension schemes, officially recognized by EU Parliament and Council144 
• Individual pension products 
In this way we can identify PRIIPs as a horizontal category of products that excludes: products 
without investment risk, direct holding of shares and bond, deposits other than structured, 
general insurance with benefits payment only on death or incapacity and pension product or 
fund with primary purpose retirement income. 
 
2.1. PRIIPs’ Categories 
The European Commission identified four main categories of PRIIPs: Investment funds, 
Insurance-based investment products, Retail structured securities and Structured term 
deposit145. 
 
2.1.1. Investment Funds 
The investment fund is an amount of capital composed by investments of numerous clients 
pooled in a collective way. It could be perceived also as investment product with the aim to 
collect investor’s capital. Investment funds play an important role in accumulation of personal 
savings. Investor owns complete control of his own shares but can’t decide how to dispose 
assets owned by the fund. Decisions about assets that should be purchased or sold are taken by 
the manager of the fund. EU regulator laid down different categories of funds to create a market 
free from barrier for investment fund. Directive 20009/65/EC defines Undertakings Collective 
                                                          
142 All classes in Annex I Directive 2009/138/EC 
143 Securities defined at Art 1 Directive 2003/71/EC 
144 Included pension funds within the scope of Directive 2003/41/EC or Directive 2009/138/EC. 
145 EU MEMO/14/299, 2014 
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Investment in Transferable Securities. UCITS cover 75% of collective investment by small 
investors in Europe and it includes investments in transferable securities or other asset specified 
managed under the principle of risk-spreading146. Units of UCITS shall be repurchased or 
redeemed, in a direct or indirect way on request of the holder. The value of UCITS’ stock 
exchange value shall be strictly anchored to net asset value, in different case this value is 
regarded as equivalent value of repurchase or redemption147. There are also other types of funds 
in the market, which are not regulated by UCITS directive. Alternative investment fund 
managers (AIFM) defines funds designed with alternative investment schemes for professional 
investors and not included in UCITS. This category includes a lot of kinds of funds, among 
them institutional funds. EU regulator defined also European Venture Capital Funds (EuVECA) 
which pool money to invest in early stage company or in start-ups, European Social 
Entrepreneurship funds (EuSEF) characterized by investment in positive social impact rather 
than maximize profits and European Long-Term Investment Funds (ELTIF) that focus 
investment in infrastructures, real assets and enterprises. The funds described above are 
characterized by incentives and concessions from government. Other kinds of fund are oriented 
to undertake leverage to meet operational requirement or apply very different trading strategies 
in listed or not listed securities. This huge subcategory of AIFM contains Private equity funds 
and Hedge funds. 
An important and further distinction between investment funds is between open-end and closed-
end funds. This difference is about the way in which the fund issue and retire shares. An Open-
end fund issue new share every time that there is an investor that add cash to the fund, and on 
the other side retire share when the investor wants to liquidate his shares. This kind of fund is 
priced one time per day, and usually at the end of trading day. This kind of share management 
represent most of investment funds even if it is exposed to withdrawals risk if underperform in 
a short run148, but on the other hand this structure seems to solve agency problem. Closed-end 
funds issue a static number of share available to be traded on an exchange. It raises capital 
through an IPO with a fix number of shares which are indexed to the interest in portfolios 
typically focus on specific markets or industry sector. Supply and demand of the investors 
determine the value of the fund, so market fluctuation can influence the performance of funds 
in an unlinked way respect to the performance of the assets. 
                                                          
146 EU Commission, Consultation on cross-border distribution of investment funds, 2016, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/growth-and-investment/investment-funds_it 
147 Art 1 (2) (b), Directive 2009/65/EC 
148 J.C. STEIN, why are most funds open-end? Competition and the limits of arbitrage, QUARTERLY 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS page 267 
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Types of funds in the market are well diversified and can satisfy different requirements of the 
investors, but the main characteristic that the client have to keep in mind is that the fund is 
managed by the manager which takes decision about the investment strategy of the fund. 
Managers decide in which securities invests, the goal of the fund, the risk profile, the degree of 
diversification the timing of investment and all the aspects that regard to the going concern of 
the fund. The choice of the fund in which invest shall be weighted over different characteristic 
like strategy, market and general risk. A professional investor, which is aware to different 
aspects of markets and consequent potential strategies have to investigate more technical factor 
of funds respect to a retailer. Considering only about the strategies that could be choosen by the 
manager there are so many possibilities that is difficult for a retailer understand the way in 
which money are invested.  
 
Figure 2. 1149: the degree of complexity which characterized the strategies of a hedge fund.  
UCITS distinction is relevant for the application of a different transparency policy with respect 
to PRIIPs, in fact KIID is a specific tool, used for UCITS and it is designed in directive 
2009/65/EC. This format anticipated KID and explain to clients the essential characteristics of 
the UCITS, providing information in concise manner oriented to inform in direct and simple 
way the investor. It shall specify how is possible to obtain further information about the UCITS.  
 
                                                          
149Image took by pavilioncorp.com, Classification performed by Pavilion. 
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2.1.2 Insurance-Based Investment Products  
Insurance-Based Investment Products are characterized by a binary nature since they include 
an insurance coverage against biometrics risk alongside an investment element. In this way a 
single product includes different needs of the customer, this kind of security is designed for 
those clients that are looking for Investment chance and Insurance coverage at the same time. 
The main aspect to respect for an insurance-based investment product is the link, direct or 
indirect, with the market fluctuation. Thus, it is not relevant if the investor is directly or 
indirectly exposed to risk of capital loss. The categories included are traditional capital life 
insurance, hybrid products and unit-linked life insurance. The investment part of product is 
integrated in the insurance policy, in this way part of the costs of the product are referred to 
investment and other, called premium, to insurance. The insurance part of the product offers 
different benefits like for example income protection that allow to maintain a given life standard 
even if the consumer is no abler to work due to any impossibility contained in the contract, 
either temporary or permanent. Other benefits are: protection of surviving dependents, 
succession planning and long-term care; all these kinds of benefits are exclusive of insurance-
based products and basically it is the element of distinction respect to another investment 
product150. Anyway, the nature of the insurance shall be approved in Art 2 of Directive 
1286/2014. This article essentially excludes non-life insurance, pension product for income in 
retirement as primary purpose and life insurance contract which do not allow to retire the 
premium before death or before the diagnosis of the illness that determine the incapacity.  
The ratio of legislator is to maintain the nature of investment opportunity also for an insurance 
product, including in insurance-based investment product, only products which allow to 
investor to participate to profit through a reduction of maturity. These products have the 
characteristic to cover the biometric risk, and at the same time allow to the investors the use of 
options to participate to profit, under the rules of the contract.  
The insurance benefits derived by these kinds of products are covered by higher cost with 
respect to other investments. The costs are separated in investment costs and on the other side 
insurance premium. The investment cost is the amount of money that is invested on the market 
and it is necessary for all types of investment in regulated market, insurance premium is a 
payment designated to cover the insurance benefit attached to the product. This cost structure 
could confuse the investor since he or she can perceive a higher cost respect a comparable 
investment not linked to insurance product. By the way premium shall never be represented as 
                                                          
150 O. FABRY, A. CIUNGU, insurance-based investment products benefits, Insurance Europe 
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a cost because it reflects an additional benefit required by the client and not a pure cost of the 
investment. This particular structure of the product implies a problem of transparency, in fact 
the client is not able to comprehend the cost’s structure and thus he or she is not in a fair position 
to compare insurance-based investment with other types of investment. This transparency 
problem shall be disclosed by advisor in order to achieve a correct representation of costs, if 
not the investors are misled and so discouraged to invest in investment product which at the 
same time cover biometric risk only because perceived as more expensive. 
This line of thinking is reflected also in KID151 that represents insurance premium in a separate 
section respect to the one dedicated to the cost of products, so clients identify clearly different 
cost of the product and can compare different scenarios of investment. The clear distinction of 
cost and premium allow to assess different combination of investment, providing to client the 
possibility to compare traditional investment product, insurance-based investment product and 
traditional insurance.  
 
2.1.3 Retail Structured Deposits 
Structured products are designed by a pre-set formulas or algorithm which calculate returns and 
loss, in this way the manufacturer built an investment product with a return linked to one or 
more underlying assets or to markets fluctuation152. Retail structured products can take many 
forms, and they include the most complex product available in the market. This category of 
product is manufactured to satisfy highly customized risk-return objective but are available also 
relative simple product. The base form of a structured product does not present a high degree 
of complexity, it is designed with a traditional investment product and substituting usual 
payment features with a payoff linked to performance of one or more underlying assets or 
indexes. Payoffs of structured product can be considered contingent and strictly linked to model 
of option pricing. However structured products can contain also other more complex derivatives 
such as swap, forwards and futures, as well as more exotic products that includes leverage 
upside participations or downside buffers. Investor has to be aware that a higher degree of 
complexity in which is structured the return of the product correspond to a higher fee for the 
seller, even if the cost is contained in total price of operation. 
A risk common to all structured securities is a relative lack of liquidity respect other products 
due to two structural factors; first is the impossibility to realize the return of performance before 
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maturity for some categories of structured product and the second is the customized nature of 
product. Investors prefer to hold these instruments till maturity given the low degree of 
liquidity, so these instruments are recognized such as “held to maturity” investment decision 
rather than a product used to undertake speculative strategies. To improve the liquidity of 
structured products Barclays Bank in 2006 introduced Exchange-Traded Notes (ETNs), it’s 
structured to be similar to ETFs the main difference is that ETNs are Debt instrument with the 
cash flow linked to underlying asset’ s performance. The advantage consists in a higher liquidity 
since it is traded like a common stock in the exchange and the possibility to access particular 
exposure that otherwise will be difficult to reach. Structured product can be differentiated in 
products that provide a capital protection for the investors and other which sacrifice the 
protection to achieve higher potential return. Product without capital protection can incorporate 
the risk to lose the principal153 or part of it. This problem is similar to the risk involved with 
options, but for this product there is not a uniform pricing standard model and so there is a weak 
transparency of pricing. The majority of issuer compute the price of structured products with 
own option models which can allow to hide to client costs and fee structure154. The traditional 
structured products in the example is composed by a bond with zero coupon that ensure stability 
to the investment, and the second component is a call option on an equity instrument like a ETF 
or a stock. The initial investment of client corresponds to the value at maturity of bond, so the 
investment in this case is guarantee, by the way the risky part is represented by the option which 
in this case have a downside value of zero and a upside value linked to the performance of the 
underlying during the period of investment. 
Figure 2. 2155: example of a retail structured securities with capital protection. 
                                                          
153 “amount of money that someone has invested in a bank or lent to a person or organization so that they will 
receive interest on it from the bank, person, or organization” Cambridge dictionary. 
154 Settlement between Deutsche Bank and the Department of Justice give us a clear example of misleading 
information about the pricing of RMBS. 
155 METEOR, A guide to retail structured products, 2016 
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For this product the principal is fully protected, it is means that after six years the client will get 
back at least the amount of initial investment, independently to the fluctuation of underlying 
asset of option. The only loss of investor is the potential gain that the investor could be earned 
investing the sum corresponding to option price in other safer investment. This type of 
protection is designed in a simple way but are available in the market also more complex 
structure protection  
Investor’s preferences could be oriented to greater exposure in upside performance and so could 
be interested in turn down a part, or whole capital protections to risk more capital. This sacrifice 
of protection paves the way to the possibility to achieve higher performance than a structured 
product with principal protection. The mechanism that allows higher return is quite intuitive, if 
an investor bet on an underlying asset with a positive return can receive the double of the return 
with a cap for the gain, but participate to loss one-to-one for the downside, so there is not 
principal protection.  
The possible negative impact of performances on capital shall be added to the initial cost of 
investment, so the investor can potentially lose all the amount invested. Usually products are 
structured in such a way that the capital exposed to loos is settled at the starting point of the 
investment. 
 
Figure 2. 3156: example of a retail structured securities without capital protection. 
Structured securities became popular in Europe and reached also a good share of market in 
USA, because they were offered as SEC-registered products, it is a certification for products 
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Packaged Retail Insurance-Based Investment Products 47 
 
 
available for retail investors such as stocks, bonds, ETF’s and mutual funds. This success in the 
market initially was due to the fact that structured securities allow customized exposures that 
otherwise would be difficult to reach, and so structured products became one of the main 
complement to traditional components of diversified portfolios. The successful entrance in the 
market of this product’s category allows to financial industry to exploit one more channel to 
raise funds. The investment industry typically built these products based on investor demands, 
but it started to build products in order to exploit a better-informed position with respect to the 
client157. Manufacturers operates especially with more complex product such as the infamous 
Collateralized Debt Obligations. 
CDOs were one of the main factor in the crisis of 2008, these obligations had a return linked to 
payoffs of a single ABS or a portfolio of ABS. The complex structure of this product allows to 
the manufacturer to hide low rating products in pools of higher rated products misleading the 
customer that bought this product trusting the seller158. During the crisis this product, sustained 
by a more complex structure159 fraud not only retail client but also professional investors. This 
reflect the degree of complexity of structured products which can deceive also the evaluations 
of a professional investor that should be able to understand in which underlying he is investing 
and so the risk he or she is taking. Since these kinds of product played a main role in the 
financial crisis is important to understand the errors of the past. The aim of regulator shall be 
to increase the efficiencies of the market through transparency and a more responsible use of 
these instrument which can represent an important source for investors. 
 
2.1.4 Structured Term Deposit 
Structured term deposit is a product that wrapped together a standard deposit and an investment 
product, the remuneration of structured term deposit shall be paid at maturity. The deposit can 
be exposed to different kind of investment such as interest rate, premiums or under different 
risk profile according to160: 
 Index or combination of indices, not considering variable rate linked to other interest 
rate 
 Financial instrument or combination of financial instrument 
 Commodities, other physical or non-physical and non-fungible asset 
                                                          
157 See Predatory Landing, page 14 
158 See 1.2.2) Impact of financial crisis page 9 
159 Securitization process described at page 13 
160 Art 4 Directive 2014/65/EU 
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 Foreign exchange rate or combination of rates 
The duration of these products can vary from some months to years. The initial investment in 
the product is guaranteed till a certain amount by the contract but is not covered by Deposit 
insurance scheme161. The return of the deposit is guarantee whether the investor held to 
maturity, if not the amount shall be discounted. Principal’s guarantee and eventual returns is 
linked to the creditworthiness of bank as a standard deposit. The risky part of the investment is 
incorporated by the variable return of the underlying asset. This structure in defined to ensure 
that the initial lump sum investment will be returned at the end of the investment’s period and 
at the same time achieve returns higher than standard deposits.  
The lower level of risk is compensated by the lower potential gain, in fact investors in some 
cases will not receive the full benefit of all indexes included in the investment part of the 
product. Different contracts can define the limits of the return through a pre-agreed part of 
return or a given percentage. The structure of the exposure part of the product can assume a 
complex scheme and so customers may be confused about the way in which the amount of 
money is invested. 
Anyway, the structure of the product is oriented to guarantee that, independently from limited 
performance of the exchange market, the client will get back the amount of money initially 
invested. For example, a structured deposit completely dependent by an underlying asset and 
the return of this asset can be subject to some limits such as a cap that limits the payable amount 
of return or a so-called participation rate that can limit the percentage of participation to the 
underlying asset or index in order to reduce proportionally also the return. Whether an 
investment of € 100.000 has a cap of 15% and the return at maturity is for example 20% the 
investor will gain only €15.000 and not € 20.000. On the other side under participation 
constraint of 50% the return is computed on the participated capital and so for the above 
example with a return of 20% the investor gains only 10%, which correspond to € 10.000. In 
this example even if the return is limited by the bundle settled in the contract the investor takes 
less risk. The characteristics of deposit do not allow an immediate evaluation and to withdraw 
the deposit before the maturity is necessary wait some days162. 
The coverage of the initial investment could be redundant but it’s an important aspect because 
help to build trust between the market and the retail investor, that is an aspect weakened in the 
last years due to recent financial crisis. Moreover, the guarantee of the initial investment helps 
                                                          
161 “deposit guarantee schemes in Europe are organized at national level, although minimum standards have been 
agreed at EU level. Under EU rules, €100,000 per depositor is guaranteed through such schemes” ECB 
definition. 
162 Chapter 3 shows how is exposed to client different characteristics of products 
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customer to differentiate structured product by structured term deposit. In fact, for a structured 
term deposit the principal is guarantee any time that the investor withdraws at maturity, on the 
other hand structured products do not guarantee every time the return of initial investment. 
 
2.2. Drawback of PRIIPs 
Complexity of products 
PRIIPs description shows that this category of products includes a wide range of securities with 
different goals and natures, but which respect common characteristics. The main structure of 
products follows traditional investment products already present in the market; the aspect hard 
to understand is the way in which the return of the product is determined. The formulas settled 
by the manufacturer of the product can assume a high degree of complexity since the return can 
be linked to a chain composed by different underlings; which in turns, participate to the return 
of the main product in different participation size and percentage of return. These products can 
be indexed themselves to the return of other products, building a more complex chain to 
disclose. This complexity increases in an exponential way when more products are packaged 
together, defining an investment tough to understand also for a professional investor. PRIIPs 
become trickier in correspondence of an increasing number of underlying assets which built the 
multiples layers of indexation. Moreover, the sophistication of the formula which links the 
products to the market fluctuation plays a crucial role in the comprehensibility of the product. 
Whether indexation formula changes for every link of the chain the effective source of the 
investment return is hard to disclose. The intricacy of PRIIPs already favored the exploitation 
of asymmetric information scenarios by investment firms, and the securitization process is a 
clear example163. On the other hand, it is fair to consider that complex formulas are used to 
satisfy clients, in fact them allow to build personalized returns which are not possible to achieve 
with traditional products. The benefit for the investors are clear but at the same time complexity 
of product shall be under the supervision of the authorities. PRIIPs characteristics amplifies the 
different level of awareness of the client and the investment firm; thus, to avoid the post crisis 
scenario, the legislator has to implement an effective transparency, learning by the errors of the 
past. PRIIPs are not subject only to problems derived from complexity but have to face also 
problems and risk which affect the whole financial market. The return of products is defined by 
the underlying asset, that for PRIIPs is more complicated to disclose due to the indexation 
process described above. The fact that is complicated understand which is the underlying asset 
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of the product and the way in which is linked to the final return do not exclude that the product 
is affected by common risk of financial market. The risk of a PRIIP is not belonging to different 
nature respect other product, it is only more difficult analyze all the chain that define the ratio 
between return and risk of the investment. Factors which affect the market impact on the value 
of underlying asset defining positive or negative fluctuation. 
Risks involved 
The environment of the financial market is itself a source of risk, the problem is not limited to 
generic risk but includes also a lot of specific risks. These two risks influence the market in 
different way. Generic risk is a so called “systematic risk”, it is not possible to diversify and it 
is represented by fluctuations derived by macro factors’ effect, such as recessions, natural 
disasters or political disorders that affects performance of overall financial market. About 
specific risks, it is meant a risk that affect only a defined number of assets, like for example a 
single firm, a group of company or a specific economic sector. Specific risk is diversifiable and 
can be divided in Business risk, that is referred to efficiency of the business cycle, and Financial 
risk that relates with the financial structure of the company. Risks are classified also by nature, 
one of these, is Liquidity risk which play an important role in the Market. Liquidity is defined 
by European Central Bank as “the ability of an economic agent to exchange his or her existing 
wealth for goods and service or for other asset”164 by this definition is clear that liquidity is 
linked to the marketability of a product. Obviously, this risk has a direct impact also for PRIIPs 
in general since are products with a complex structure and is not easy for a retailer know the 
best moment to divest maximizing the potential return. Asymmetries in information contributes 
to hinder the efficiency of the market and also Liquidity risk. Furthermore, market is affected 
by Credit risk, which is represented by the probability of loss due to the borrower’s failure to 
pay back a contractual obligation or a loan. This risk is widely spread in the market and can be 
potentially associated to every transaction in a direct or indirect way. In fact, especially for 
PRIIPs this risk could be indirectly hold by the retail investor since the cash flow of the product 
is indexed to the performance of another security that is affected by credit risk. Different risks 
can affect the same product, for example a product with performance is linked to the cash flow 
of a mortgage is exposed first to credit risk if the borrower is not able to repay the credit. 
Secondly if the borrower default lender has the possibility to sell the collateral in the market 
and at this point occur the liquidity risk. Liquidity risk can affect directly also the PRIIP if the 
holder of the product wants to trade it in the market. The multiple exposures to risks is an 
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important aspect, the legislator took it into account for the determination of new measure of 
product’s risk165.
                                                          
165 See section 3.3.4 Summary Risk Indicator, page 68 
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3. Key Information Document 
Collocation of Kid respect other regulations 
The new form of product description introduced with Regulation 1286/2014, which innovates 
the disclosure process of the product. The investor, before the introduction of KID, took as 
benchmark the prospectus to understand the structure and characteristics of product. In 
particular, “final terms”, which is the part that contain the core of the product, is a schematic 
and technical definition. The difference between the new form of transparency, and the old one 
is observable in the Appendix 1 and 2. The previous form of transparency is still in force, but 
it is not the main tool used to understand the features of financial product, in fact prospectus is 
more oriented to the registration of the product in financial market and final terms have the role 
to define the core of the product. The needs of a new tool for the investor protection is given by 
the impossibility to overcome the transparency paradox166 with the tools settled by legislator 
till that moment. The KID is also a way to uniform167 rules of transparency for all Packaged 
Retail Insurance-Based Investment Product and at the same time pursue the objective of 
rebuilding the confidence of retail investors in the financial market168. The regulation which 
designed the KID is applicable to all products defined as PRIIPs, and so exposed to the 
fluctuation or performance of assets on the financial market169. The Regulation 1286/2014 is 
complementary170 to MIFID II and to Directive 2002/92/EC171, excluding insurance product 
which do not carry out investment opportunities. The regulation establishes also the relation 
with other obligation defined by other legislative act in term of transparency and investor 
protection, confirming that the prospectus designed by Directive 2003/71/EC and Directive 
20019/138/EC are still in force and continue to be applied alongside PRIIPs Regulation172. 
Member States as for Prospectus have to set an authority for the supervision of KIDs’ 
compliance, the authority shall verify the content of KID to ensure that the document is in line 
with the regulation and that the investors’ protection is ensured in the financial market. The 
information contained in KID shall be in line with the general principles settled in MIFID II; 
thus, the information shall be fair, clear accurate and not misleading for the individual. PRIIPs 
Regulation173 is implemented by Regulation 2017/653 which set technical standards for the 
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167 Recital (4) Regulation 1286/2014 
168 Recital (2) Regulation 1286/2014 
169 Recital (6) Regulation 1286/2014 
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171 Not in force from 30/9/2018, directive which regulate the insurance product. 
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content of KID. The aim of this regulation is the implementation of transparency and is not 
focused on the introduction of a new passport for the sale of PRIIPs to clients. Moreover, the 
legislator doesn’t want to modify the responsibilities between existing authorities of Member 
States under the passport arrangements, maintaining the powers of the authority valid also for 
marketing supervision of product174.  
UCITS are financial products which enter in the categories regulated by PRIIPs regulation, 
however, a more recent directive175 established the use of another tool for UCITS’ transparency, 
called Key Investors Information Document176. This misalignment between KID and KIID shall 
be solved with a period of transition of 5 years after the entry in force of this regulation, which 
took place in 1st January 2018177. During this period UCITS will be regulated by KIID and so 
will not be subject to this regulation, but at the end of the transitional period and in absence of 
other regulations UCITS are going to be regulated under PRIIPs Regulation.  
A review of PRIIPs Regulation is already settled after four years from the date of entry in 
force178; the legislator decided to be prepared for a further future modification of regulation. 
The objective is to be ready to face new problems such as new types of PRIIPs, future 
development of financial market or developments in Member States of the union179. At this date 
the legislator shall assess also the possibility to introduce the difference between social and 
environmental investments, evaluating if the transition period referred to KIID shall be 
extended or not and whether the introduction of KID had a positive effect on the comparability 
and understanding of the product. The review includes a survey which concern the availability 
of calculator for aggregate costs and fees of PRIIPs. 
 
3.1. Form and Content  
Key information document is a disclosure document which shall be draw up by the 
manufacturer of the PRIIP before the availability of the product on the market180. KID is 
designed to protect the investors during the relation with the advisor, increasing the effective 
transparency of the product and so the awareness of the investor with respect to the investment. 
The Document shall be designed following the main guidelines, content in Regulation 
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176 See page 34 
177 Art 18 Regulation 2017/653/EU 
178 January 2018 
179 Recital (36) Regulation 1286/2014 
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1286/2014 and the tighter technical standard defined in Regulation 2017/653. The analysis will 
involve in a first moment the main principles of KID, which determined the main structure of 
the document, and secondly technical standard to appreciate the way in which the legislator 
implements the details that characterized KID. 
The Key Information Document is part of pre-contractual information and is an obligation for 
investment advisor provide it to investor before the sign of the contract. It shall follow the 
principles of accuracy, fairness and clarity to do not mislead the client during the assessment 
operation. Being a link between the client and the product, the document shall be coherent with 
the terms and condition of the PRIIPs181. KID is thought to be a standalone document, anyway 
it can contain reference to other informative document defined by EU, but only if the reference 
is strictly linked to an information that shall be included182 in KID. For example, kid could 
contain some cross-reference to Prospectus to clarify some step or to give the possibility to 
clients to obtain further information. By the way all the required information must be content 
in KID and cross reference have not to affect the unique nature of the document. On the other 
side, is not allowed references to marketing material, in fact KID must be completely separated 
from this kind of information because could influence the consistency and the transparency of 
the document183. In contrast with Prospectus, KID has a pre-settled length, it shall be written in 
a briefly manner in a maximum of three sides of A4 sized paper184, the legislator defines three 
principles that a KID must respect; it shall be: 
 Easy to read, and presented with readable character 
 Focused on key information needed by retail investors 
 Written with clear succinct and comprehensible  
The format of the document can contain colors, whether they are used shall not prejudge the 
clearance and completeness of the document printed in white and black185. The use of 
manufacturer’s logo or corporate brand is allowed inside limits. It shall not cover or obscure 
the text or distract the attention of client from the information contained in the KID186. The 
language used shall be comprehensible for the client which have to disclose the characteristics 
of the product, so the legislator obliges to use the official language used in the Member State 
where the product is sold187. Whether the document is not available in the language required, it 
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185 Art 6 (5) Regulation 1286/2014 
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shall be translated in accurately and closely way, reporting the content of the original KID. In 
the first page of the document must be written at the top “Key Information Document” and shall 
be directly following by the explanatory statement: 
“This document provides you with key information about this investment product. It is not 
marketing material. The information is required by law to help you understand the nature, risk, 
costs, potential gains and losses of this product and help you to compare it with other 
products.”188  
In this briefly description the legislator wants to be sure that the client understands the scope of 
the document, and that it is laid down following law defined by legislator and thus oriented to 
help the investors. First, it is specified that the document contains only the key information of 
the product and so do not show all the information but only what is considered crucial by the 
legislator. The target of the document is the transparency, and it is specified also through the 
citation of the main fields that the document wants to explain and disclose to the investor. The 
explanatory statement concludes with an important insight for the customer; in fact, 
communicate that the underlying document is not useful only to understand the single product 
but also to compare it with other PRIIPs. The content of KID is divided in subsection to achieve 
a schematic layout of the document189: 
 General information section 
 What is the product? 
 What are the risk and what could I get in return? 
 What happen if the Manufacturer is not able to pay out? 
 What are the cost? 
 How long should I hold it, and can I take money out early? 
 How can I complain? 
 Other relevant information 
This scheme is settled to standardized KIDs and provide a logic scheme to the assessment of 
the investment. KID mix the rigid and precise template in which it is structured with general 
principles settled in Art 6 (4)190. The information contained in these sections constitutes the 
core of the KID and shall be closely based on the requirements of Regulation 1286/2014 and 
Regulation 2017/653 to not affect the validity of KID. Marketing information which contain a 
description of PRIIP shall not include contradiction of KID or reduce the importance of KID. 
                                                          
188 Art 8 (2) Regulation 1286/2014 
189 Designed before in Directive 1286/2014 and confirmed in technical standard Regulation 2017/653 
190 See Appendix 1 
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Moreover, marketing communication must show the presence of KID and the channels from 
which it can be obtained, included the manufacturer’s website191. The information contained in 
KID shall be object of review by the manufacturer and whether the review highlight that need 
a change in the document the manufacturer shall revise the KID192. In Appendix 1 is possible 
to appreciate a real KID to link all the information to a tangible example. 
 
General information section 
This section relates with the Manufacturer of PRIIPs and the competent authority designated 
by Member State. General information section shall contain the name which the PRIIPs’ 
manufacturer assigned to the product, and if available the International Securities Identification 
Number of the KID (ISIN) or the Unique Product Identifier193. The legal name of the 
manufacturer shall be followed by the address of website and any useful information to enter 
in contact with PRIIPs manufacturer also through telephone number194. The section shall 
content also the name of competent authority for the supervision of KID, the date of production 
of the document and a notice, if it has been revised, of the date last revision. These general data 
about the manufacturer and the supervisor authority help the client in the identification of the 
subjects involved in the investment, provide in an effective way useful channels of 
communication. The section shall present the phrase: “you are about to purchase a product that 
is not simple and may be difficult to understand”195 to alert investor whether the PRIIPs is 
considered too complex by the law196.  
                                                          
191 Art 9 Regulation 1286/2014 
192 Art 10 Regulation 1286/2014 
193 Art 1 (a) Regulation 2017/653 
194 Art 1 (c) Regulation 2017/653 
195 Art 8 (3) (b) Regulation 1286/2014 
196 This sentence results mandatory in case the “product is an insurance-based investment product which does 
not meet the requirements laid down in Article 30(3)(a) of Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council” or if “it is a PRIIP which does not meet the requirements laid down in points (i)-(vi) of 
Article 25(4)(a) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council”. As defined in Art 1 
Regulation 2017/653. 
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3.2. What is the Product?  
This section defines the main characteristics and the nature of the PRIIPs specifying the type 
of product and legal form197. The aim of this section is to define the objectives of the PRIIP and 
the means used to achieve the objective settled, which shall be described in a synthetic, easy 
and clear way. The type of exposure used to achieve the objective shall be specified whether it 
is direct or indirect, with respect to the underlying asset. Thus, the factors which influence the 
return of PRIIPs shall be identified with the underlying asset or reference value. In particular, 
must be defined how the return is determined and the relation between the return of product and 
the underlying198. In case that the underlying is referred to a multiple number of assets or 
references values and at the same time, KID cannot content a specific description for each one, 
shall be described by KID only the types of instrument or the market segment at which they 
belong199.  
The profile’s description of suitable retail client shall be provided at the end of this section, in 
this way the manufacturer sets the main features that shall be respected by the client that 
purchase the product. In a sense, the manufacture at the moment of the creation of the product 
already know the type of client at which the PRIIP is intended to be sold. This type of 
consideration on the “target retail client” depends on needs, characteristics and different 
investment objectives of clients. The evaluation of the manufacturer is based on: the ability to 
bear losses, technical knowledge, investment horizon and previous experience on the market. 
Since that the manufacture is the agent that better know the product, the legislator established 
that it shall identify in KID the type of client for which the product is marketed200. 
PRIIPs that contain or offer insurance benefits shall be supported by details which clarify all 
the aspects and conditions of the insurance part of the investment. The “key features of the 
insurance contract” is the name of the summary that defines benefits of insurance, but the 
manufacturer shall specify through an explanatory statement that benefit’s value are reported 
in another appropriate section of KID called “what are the risk and what I could get in return”. 
In the section “what is the product?” the manufacturer has to includes all the information about 
the characteristic of biometric risk of retail client. It must show the overall premium of the 
PRIIP and the part of biometric risk premium that constitute the overall premium. Subsequently 
shall be shown the impact, at the end of the recommended holding period, of the biometric risk 
                                                          
197 Art 8 (3) (c) (i) Regulation 1286/2014 
198 Art 2 (2) Regulation 2017/653 
199 In Appendix 1 the product performances are linked to different shares, these share are briefly described and it 
is not provided a specific description 
200 Art 2 (3) Regulation 2017/653 
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premium on investment return. Vice versa can be alternative shown the impact of the cost part 
of the biometric risk premium compared to recurring costs 201 which are reported in “Cost over 
timetable”202. The amount of premium paid in single a lump-sum form shall match with the 
information which report the initial amount invested. Whether the premium paid is of periodic 
nature the manufacturer shall report the number of periodic payments, an estimation of average 
amount invested and finally the estimated percentage of biometric risk premium with respect 
to annual premium.  
The term of the PRIIP, if known, shall be stated in this section providing the following 
information203: 
 Maturity date of PRIIP or eventual absence of it 
 Indication whether and when the manufacturer is allowed to terminate the PRIIP 
unilaterally 
 The possible circumstances under which the PRIIP terminate in automatic way and if 
know the termination dates. 
 
3.3. What are the Risks and What Could I Get in Return? 
After the description of the product, the legislator focuses his attention on a crucial step of the 
KID, the risk-reward profile. The section shall contain a summary risk indicator (SRI) 
supplemented by description of the indicator, including limitation and eventually aspects that 
are not captured in an effective way by the SRI204. The description that sustain SRI shall 
mention that whether a PRIIP is evaluated in a foreign currency, with respect to the currency 
of the country in which is marketed, the final return will be affected not only by the core risk 
of PRIIP but also by the currency fluctuations205. The description has to alert the client that the 
risk indicated by SRI is referred to investments which last for the whole recommended holding 
period or until the maturity of the product. Whether the investor decides to not hold till maturity 
or for recommended period could run a higher risk with respect to SRI206. Information about 
the maximum amount of loss possible and the possibility to lose the investment in absence of 
adequate protection shall be included, in particular whether207: 
                                                          
201 Art 2 (4) Regulation 2017/653 
202 Which shall be calculated in accordance with Annex VII of Regulation 2017/653 
203 Art 2 (5) Regulation 2017/653 
204 Art 8 (3) (d) (i) Regulation 1286/2014 
205 Art 3 (2) (c) Regulation 2017/653 
206 Art 3 (2) (d) Regulation 2017/653 
207 Art 8 (3) (d) (ii) Regulation 1286/2014 
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  The investor risks to lose the entire invested capital 
 There is the risk of additional financial commitments, such as liabilities in addition to 
capital invested 
 capital protection is included against market risk, specifying timing of application 
In case of early exit penalty for PRIIP the details are shown in paragraph “how long should I 
hold it and can I take money out early.” 208 
These data are reported to support and complete the information contained in SRI, which is one 
of the main character of KID. It summarizes the risk level of the PRIIP with a numerical 
indicator, based on a scale from 1 to 7. The indicator is obtained with the aggregation of Market 
Risk Measure (MRM) and the Credit Risk Measure (CRM)209. Furthermore this section shall 
illustrate the performance scenarios of the PRIIP, assisted by the assumption made, information 
on return’s condition and eventual impact of tax legislation210. 
 
3.3.1. Market Risk Assessment 
Market risk is measured with volatility of PRIIP on annualized base, it is computed with the 
Value-at-Risk (VaR)211 with a confidence interval of 97.5% over the recommended holding 
period. The annualized volatility of PRIIPs is known as VaR-equivalent Volatility (VEV) but 
it is not computed in the same way for all PRIIPs, whose are divided in four categories212 for 
the purpose of market risk measurement: 
 Category 1 includes the riskier products such as the PRIIP that are priced less than 
monthly base. Are included also PRIIPs have not an appropriate proxy or benchmark or 
it is priced on less regular basis than monthly. This category involves products which 
following the market fluctuation could lose the entire or more than entire amount of the 
investment. This section of product is composed also by Financial contract for 
difference, Derivatives for transfer of credit risk, Options, Futures, Swap and 
Forward213. 
                                                          
208 Art 3 (2) (e) Regulation 2017/653 
209 Annex II Regulation 2017/653 
210 Art 8 (d) (III, IV, V) Regulation 1286/2014 
211 “Largest loss likely to be suffered on an investment or portfolio position over a holding period with a given 
probability, determined by the confidence interval used in the computation.” Definition reported by Business 
Dictionar. 
212 Annex II, Part 1 (3), Regulation 2017/653 
213 Defined in Annex I, Section C, items 4 to 10 of MIFID II  
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 Category 2 contain PRIIPs that offer to the investor a non-leverage exposure to the 
prices of underlying or a leverage exposure on underlying which allow to receive a 
constant multiple of the price of underlying asset. The exposure can be directly or based 
on synthetic basis. Are admitted in this category only products with a documented 
historical price. The product shall present 2 years of daily prices, in alternative 4 years 
of weekly price or in the worst case 5 years of monthly prices. The category accepts 
also benchmark or proxy which satisfy required length and frequency of historical 
prices214. 
 Category 3 covers PRIIPs that are indexed at the value of an underlying asset but with 
a formula different from the constant multiple of the underlying. As for category number 
2 are required historical prices, thus the PRIIPs shall present 2 years of daily prices, in 
alternative 4 years of weekly price or in the worst case 5 years of monthly prices. The 
category accepts also benchmark or proxy which satisfy required length and frequency 
of historical prices215. 
 Category 4 include PRIIPs with a value influenced by factors that are not directly 
observed in the market216, covering also the insurance-based product. 
In case that the manufacturer presents proxies or benchmarks, in substitution of historical 
prices, them shall illustrate the asset or the fluctuations which determined the performance of 
the product. Moreover, proxies and benchmarks shall be supported by the documentation 
referred to this alternative instrument. The classification of PRIIPs in these four categories is 
aimed to compute the MRM in different ways for different categories. 
MRM for Category 1 has not a formula that calculate the annualized volatility, but MRM is 
assigned by default. Whether the PRIIP belong to this category only because it is priced with 
unregularly base, less regular than monthly or it isn’t available appropriate proxy or benchmark 
the MRM class assigned is equal to 6. All the other products shall be classified with a MRM 
class of 7, which is the riskiest. 
The MRM class for Category 2 is computed taking in consideration the observed distribution 
of PRIIPs’ returns for the computation of Value at Risk. The returns shall be computed217, over 
the minimum frequency of observation available, defining over each period the natural 
logarithm of ratio between price at the end of current period and price at the end of the previous 
                                                          
214 Annex II, Part 1 (5), Regulation 2017/653 
215 Annex II, Part 1 (6), Regulation 2017/653 
216 Annex II, Part 1 (7), Regulation 2017/653 
217 Annex II, Part 1 (12), Regulation 2017/653 
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period218. These data are used to build a distribution of returns  (𝑟𝑖) used to compute measured 
moments of the distribution from which are calculated volatility219, skew220 and kurtosis221 that 
are the measures needed for the calculus of VaR. The formula given is derived by the Cornish-
Fisher Expansion. It is an alternative approach to calculate VaR and fill the inefficiencies of 
classical method for distributions that are not Gaussian, converging with usual parametric VaR 
for Gaussian distribution. 
The VaR measure in return space is computed as follows: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒) = 𝜎√𝑁 ∗ (−1,96 + 0,474 ∗
𝜇1
√𝑁
− 0.0687 ∗
𝜇2
𝑁
+ 0.146 ∗
𝜇1
2
𝑁
) − 0,5𝜎2𝑁 
N: number of trading period in the recommended holding period 
𝜇1: skew measured from return distribution 
𝜇2: kurtosis measured from return distribution 
𝜎: volatility measured from return distribution  
Values used to calculate volatility, skew and kurtosis are computed with the moments measured 
in the distribution with the following criteria: 
 Moment zero 𝑀0: count of the number of observations in the observation period 
 Moment first 𝑀1 : mean of all return in the sample 
 Moment n: ∑ (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑀1)
𝑛
𝑖 /𝑀0 
The value of VaR return space shall be used to calculate the VEV which is given by: 
𝑉𝐸𝑉 = [√(3,842 − 2 ∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒) − 1,96] /√𝑇 
The outcome of this formula shall be associated to values contained in Table 3 to establish the 
value of MRM which correspond to the PRIIPs. Whether the data used for the calculation of 
VEV are based on monthly base the class assigned shall be enhanced by one additional MRM 
class. 
There is an exception for PRIIPs that are under management oriented to pursue certain reward 
objectives, participating through flexible investment strategies or policies in different assets 
                                                          
218 Prices refereed to the moment of the market close. 
219 “it is the degree of variation of a series over time”  
220 “it is a measure of distortion and represent the asymmetry of the probability distribution random variables 
about its means” 
221 “it measures the distance of the distribution from the normal distribution”  
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classes. PRIIPs under this niche of Category 2 shall use the VEV with the higher values within 
the following222: 
1. VEV calculated in accordance with method of Category 2 
2. VEV of pro-forma asset mix, consistent, at the time of computation, with the reference 
asset allocation  
3. VEV consistent with the risk limit of the fund 
In case of variation of strategy during the observation period of returns the VEV used shall be 
the higher between 2 and 3223. 
PRIIPs in Category 3 have to take in consideration, as value for the calculation of Value at Risk, 
the distribution of PRIIPs’ price at the end of the holding period. Since the future data can’t be 
available at the moment of the assessment the manufacturer shall obtain the distribution with 
simulations of PRIIPs’ price. The VaR value must be computed with an interval of confidence 
of 97.5% at the end of the recommended holding period. The value obtained shall be discounted 
to present at the expected free-risk discount factor224. The minimum number of simulation is 
10000 225, the simulation shall be performed on bootstrapping226 the expected distribution of 
price levels for underlying assets from the distribution of returns. The variables observed by the 
manufacture can be spot prices or curves. The use of spot price or curves imply two different 
methodology of simulations required by the legislator. Whether PRIIP, which belong to this 
category, is characterized by unconditional capital protection it is not required a simulation. 
The Value at Risk is calculated discounting the amount guaranteed by capital protection, at the 
expected free-risk discount factor, calculated at the end of recommended holding period. 
Category 4 includes PRIIPs with performance of part of performance linked to unobservable 
factors or under the control of PRIIP’s manufacturer. The VaR for this kind of product shall be 
assessed in the following way. The PRIIPs components shall be identified and associated to 
other Categories of PRIIPs if possible227, on the other side, whether is not possible associate the 
component to other classes it shall be evaluated as wholly dependent from unobserved factor. 
For each component that is associated to a PRIIPs’ class the VEV shall be computed following 
the method indicated by legislator. Components which depends wholly from unobserved factors 
shall follow a robust and well recognized industry to estimate the future contribution of this 
                                                          
222 Annex II, Part 1 (14) (a), Regulation 2017/653 
223 Annex II, Part 1 (14) (b), Regulation 2017/653 
224 Annex II, Part 1 (16), Regulation 2017/653 
225 Annex II, Part 1 (19), Regulation 2017/653 
226 “bootstrap method is a resampling technique used to estimate statistics on a population by sampling a dataset 
with replacement”, J. BROWNLEE, Statistical method, 2018. 
227 Annex II, Part 1 (26), Regulation 2017/653 
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factor. This method is focused on the estimation of a relevant expectations if possible, whether 
is not possible link the component to a well-recognized industry shall be used a bootstrap 
methodology set out for the computation of VEV in Category 3. The VEV for PRIIPs 
component will be the combination of Bootstrap methodology and well-defined industry. The 
final value of VEV for these products shall be a weighted average to define the overall VEV in 
a proportional way. In case of unconditional protection of capital, the VaR is computed 
discounting the amount of capital protected, at the end of recommended holding period, using 
the risk-free discount factor expected, maintaining the confidence interval at the constant level  
of 97,5%228. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 1: Conversion of VEV in MRM class, it describes the corresponding MRM class of a 
PRIIP for a given level of VEV229 
 
3.3.2. Credit Risk Assessment 
Credit Risk play a role whether PRIIPs, its underlying assets or exposures are influenced by the 
creditworthiness of manufacturer or other agents that are bounded to perform payments to the 
investors, in a direct or indirect way. The entity which shall make the payment to the investor 
for a PRIIP is identified as the “direct obligor”, and the assessment of credit risk shall be 
performed on this entity. When payment obligations are guaranteed by an agent different from 
the direct obligor, identified as “guarantor”, the credit risk assessment of guarantor can 
substitute the assessment of the direct obligor. The guarantor shall cover unconditionally and 
irrevocably the obligation or obligations, if not can’t substitute the credit assessment of direct 
obligor230. Credit risk assessment required a look-through basis and a cascade assessment of 
                                                          
228 Annex II, Part 1 (29), Regulation 2017/653 
229 Annex II, Part 1 (2), Regulation 2017/653 
230 Annex II, Part 2 (32), Regulation 2017/653 
MRM Class VaR-equivalent volatility (VEV) 
1 < 0,5 
2 0,5% - 5,0% 
3 5,0% - 12% 
4 12% - 20% 
5 20% - 30% 
6 30% - 80% 
7 >  80% 
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credit whether PRIIPs is structured with exposure to credit risk of PRIIP itself and underlying 
investments which contain further exposures to credit risk231. On the other side if the exposure 
to credit risk is referred only to underlying asset and not to PRIIP itself the credit risk shall be 
assessed at the level of underlying. PRIIPs could contain also multiple underlying asset that 
entailed exposure to Credit Risk, in this case the exposures which exceed the 10% of total asset 
shall be assessed with a separate procedure. For underlying or exposures which concern 
derivatives, exchange traded or OTC, no credit risk shall be considered whether the exposure 
is fully and appropriately collateralized or the exposure do not exceed 10% of total assets 
amount232. 
 The manufacturer of the PRIIP shall define an External Credit Assessment Institutions 
(ECAI)233 with the aim to have an independent and consistent evaluation of credit risk. It is 
possible that are available multiple ways to assess a credit risk according to that policy, in that 
case shall be considered the median rating or the lower one between the two middle values. The 
Credit Risk of the PRIIP shall be based on: 
 PRIIP’ s credit assessment assigned by ECAI 
 Credit assessment of relevant obligor performed by ECAI 
 In absence of credit assessment of PRIIP or obligor shall be performed a default credit 
assessment234. 
The output of the evaluation is a number from 0 to 6, where the higher value indicates a lower 
creditworthiness and thus a higher credit risk. In case of an assessment equal to 7 for the MRM 
is not necessary evaluate the credit risk235. 
 
Credit Quality Steps 
The allocation of credit steps is given by the translation of credit risk rating assessed by ECAI 
in number. The typical rating is expressed in letter with a codified language that can assume 
different facets for different ECAI. The legislator defines Credit Quality Step in order to 
uniform different rating codex under the same scale and do it with the Regulation 2016/1800236.  
                                                          
231 Annex II, Part 2 (33), Regulation 2017/653 
232 Annex II, Part 2 (36), Regulation 2017/653 
233 Registered with ESMA 
234 Described in the following section “credit quality step” 
235 Annex II, Part 2 (30), Regulation 2017/653 
236 Conversion’s standards provided in Appendix 5 
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Table 3. 2: Conversion of credit rating of an ECAI in Credit Quality Step, in the example ARC 
Rating SA237 
Credit Quality 
Step 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Long-term Debt 
Rating 
aaa aa+, 
aa, aa- 
a+,a,a- bbb+,bbb, 
bbb- 
bb+, 
bb, bb- 
b+,b, 
b- 
ccc+, ccc, 
ccc- 
 
The assessment with a look-through imply a conversion in credit quality step weighted on the 
average of credit quality step of any obligor considered relevant.  Whether the evaluation 
involve a cascade method all the exposures must be assessed in separate way per each layer, 
assigning the highest credit quality step. The credit quality step obtained by the assessment of 
the ECAI shall be adjusted by the manufacturer considering the maturity or recommended 
holding period of the PRIIP.  
 
Table 3. 3: conversion standard of Credit quality step in Adjusted Credit quality steps based on 
different recommended holding periods238. 
In absence of external credit assessment, the evaluation shall be implemented through the 
default credit assessment239 which evaluate with credit quality step 3 obligor regulated by 
insurance undertaking under union law and credit institution. Step 3 is given also to obligors 
which are domiciled in a Member State with credit quality step 3. All the other cases are rated 
as credit quality step 5240.  
                                                          
237 Annex Regulation 2016/1800 
238 Annex II, Part 2 (42), Regulation 2017/653 
239 See page 65 
240 Annex II, Part 2 (43), Regulation 2017/653 
Credit Quality Step Adjusted Credit quality 
Step , with recommended 
holding period up to 1 
year 
Adjusted Credit quality 
Step , with recommended 
holding period in the 
range between 1 and 12 
years 
Adjusted Credit quality 
Step , with recommended 
holding period over 12 
years 
0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 2 2 
3 2 3 3 
4 3 4 5 
5 4 5 6 
6 6 6 6 
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Credit Risk Measurement 
When the credit quality step is adjusted to recommended holding period or maturity it shall be 
converted in CRM. This rating scale is from 1 to 6 and covert the credit quality step equal to 0 
in 1, anyway, this is not the only change is required by the conversion in CRM. Whenever the 
credit right of the retail investor is subordinated to the claim of the senior layer of creditor the 
CRM conversion shall be increased by 2 classes with respect to the equivalent adjusted credit 
step quality241. The conversion states 3 classes of penalties for PRIIPs that are part of the own 
funds of the obligor of PRIIP242. 
Table 3. 4: Conversion of Adjusted credit quality steps in CRM243: 
 
Adjusted Credit Quality Step CRM 
0 1 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
 
There are some mitigation factors about the characteristic of PRIIP asset or collateral, which 
influence the assessment of CRM. In fact, may be assigned a CRM 1 to the PRIIP with an asset 
or appropriate collateral that respect following condition: 
 Value equivalent to the payment obligation at all times until maturity 
 Held with a third party on a segregated account under equivalent terms 
 Not accessible to any other creditor of the manufacturer 
The CRM assigned to the PRIIP is of level 2 whether the asset or appropriate collateral are: 
 Value equivalent to the payment obligation at all times until maturity 
 Identified and held on account or registers244 
                                                          
241 Annex II, Part 2 (50), Regulation 2017/653 
242 As defined in Art 4(1) (118) of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.  
243 Annex II, Part 2 (45), Regulation 2017/653 
244 including Articles 275 and 276 of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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 The right of claim of the of investor have priority respect to other creditor of 
manufacturer 
3.3.3. Liquidity Risk 
PRIIPs are considered under relevant liquidity risk in case that fulfill either of the subsequent 
condition: 
 PRIIP admitted to the secondary market but not guaranteed by a market maker, so 
liquidity depends on availability of demand or supply on the market. 
 Average profile of liquidity of investment is lower than regular payment frequency of 
PRIIP. 
 Manufacturer forecast difficulties for retail investor about the possibility to divest 
during the life-cycle of the product. 
The manufacturer has to advise the investor also in case of liquidity problem, which are not 
admitted to trading on a secondary market, or it is subject to limiting condition for liquidity 
facility such as discretionary redemption price and exit penalties245. In the others cases the 
PRIIP is considered liquid, by the way the liquidity risk is not computed and used to estimate 
SRI, it is only notified the presence to the client. 
 
3.3.4. Summary Risk Indicator 
The SRI take place from the aggregation of market risk measurement (MRM) and credit risk 
measurement (CRM) and is assigned to the PRIIP in accordance with the following table.  
The manufacturer shall monitor market data relevant to the computation of MRM, evaluating 
variation in the market factors which affect the MRM. Whenever it is found a variation the 
manufacturer shall attribute the corresponding MRM to the PRIIP246. Moreover, the review of 
MRM shall be performed every time that the manufacturer takes a decision about investment 
policy or strategy247. The constant monitoring shall be performed also for the credit risk criteria 
                                                          
245 Annex II, Part 3 (57), Regulation 2017/653 
246 Annex II, Part 3 (53), Regulation 2017/653 
247 Annex II, Part 3 (55), Regulation 2017/653 
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which affect the computation of CRM, whether there is a variation the manufacturer shall re-
compute the CRM class and so the overall SRI.  
 
Table 3. 5248: Aggregation process of CRM and MRM to synthesize Summary Risk Indicator. 
 
Presentation of SRI 
 
Figure 3. 1249: Template to expose the SRI in KID. 
The SRI shall be presented using the pre-settled format in order to be standardized for each 
KID, the SRI referred to the PRIIP shall be highlighted, taking also in consideration that it shall 
be understandable even if printed in black and white250.  
The presentation of SRI shall be supported by a general explanation with narrative purpose 
immediately below the SRI. First it is indicated that: The summary risk indicator is a guide to 
                                                          
248 Annex II, Part 3 (52), Regulation 2017/653 
249 Annex III (1) Regulation2017/653 
250 Annex III (1) Regulation 2017/653 
70 Key Information Document, a New Tool to Protect Investors 
the level of risk of this product compared to other products. It shows how likely it is that the 
product will lose money because of movements in the markets or because we are not able to 
pay you251. Explanation shall contain the recommended holding period and the possibility to 
run a higher risk in case of a holding period different from recommended. Whether the PRIIP 
incur in a relevant liquidity risk or to be illiquid under the SRI presentation shall be included a 
special warning. In the description of SRI shall be specified in bold characters if the PRIIP hold 
the obligation to add the initial investment or carry out a currency risk252. In this section the 
manufacturer shall specify the capital protection of the PRIIP if it hold it, describing: 
 
 Partial or total capital protection, including specification of percentage 
 Specific condition which limits the capital protection  
 No capital protection on market risk 253 
 No capital guarantee against credit risk254 
PRIIP which are offering a range of investment options with different risk classes, the 
manufacturer shall show all different levels of risk from the lower to the higher. Options and 
futures exchanged on regulated market, or an equivalent market, shall show only information 
which concerns their characteristic, summarized in general description 255 and SRI indicator 
including if necessary the specification about the absence of capital protection against market 
risk. 
3.3.5. Performance Scenarios 
After the presentation of SRI which shall give an insight about the risk level that the investors 
are running, allowing also to compare it with other PRIIP, the manufacturer shall show a range 
of possible scenarios of return. The legislator set four main scenarios256: 
1. Favorable scenario 
2. Moderate scenario 
3. Unfavorable scenario 
4. Stress scenario 
                                                          
251 Annex III (7) Element A Regulation 2017/653 
252 Annex III (4)(a) Regulation 2017/653 
253 In case the manufacturer shall indicate “This product does not include any protection from future market 
performance so you could lose some or all of your investment”. Annex III (7) Element H Regulation 2017/653. 
254 In case the manufacturer shall indicate “If (we) (are) not able to pay you what is owed, you could lose your entire 
investment”. Annex III (7) Element H Regulation 2017/653. 
255 Annex III (7) Element A Regulation 2017/653 
256 Annex IV (1) Regulation 2017/653 
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Moreover, for insurance-based investment product is required an additional scenario based on 
the parameter of Moderate scenario. 
The different scenarios are calculated in similar manner and shall be computed over the 
recommended holding period. The value represented in different scenarios represents the value 
of PRIIP at different percentiles. The favorable scenario is PRIIP’s value at 90th percentile, 
Moderate scenario at 50th percentile and unfavorable at 10th percentile257. The calculus takes in 
consideration the different reference value for different categories of PRIIP, settled for the 
computation of VEV in market risk measurement (MRM). The stress scenario takes in 
consideration different aspects for the computation and so each category has a specific 
methodology to compute the value, the details for the computation of Category 2 is contained 
in points 10 and 11 of Annex IV on the other side stress scenario for Category 3 is settled in 
points in 13 and 14 of Annex IV. “The performance of the PRIIP shall be calculated net of all 
applicable costs in accordance with Annex VI258 for the scenario and holding period being 
presented”259 to highlight the effective performance of the instrument. Performance must be 
available in monetary units and in percentage form, the computation of percentage shall be 
made with the ratio between net performance and initial investment amount260. For the 
insurance-based product shall be took in consideration the future profit participation which shall 
derive from consistent assumption in line with the annual rate of return of underlying assets. 
The assumption about the division and sharing of profits participation between investor and 
manufacturer shall be aligned with the business strategy and practices of manufacturer261. The 
components of payment that are receivables only in discretionary basis shall be added to the 
value of PRIIP only in case of Favorable performance scenarios.  
Presentation of Performance Scenario 
The presentation of performance scenario shall respect the principles of fairness, accuracy, 
clearance in order to do not mislead the average retail investor during the process of 
investment’s assessment262. Scenarios presented are referred to the recommended holding 
period as defined in previous section. Category 1 of PRIIP shall respect specific standard for 
                                                          
257 Annex IV (4,5,6,7) Regulation 2017/653 
258 Annex refereed to Regulation 2017/653  
259 Annex IV (31) Regulation 2017/653 
260 Annex IV (33) Regulation 2017/653 
261 Annex IV (34) (c) Regulation 2017/653 
262 Annex V Part 1 (1) Regulation 2017/653 
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the presentation of scenarios. The template used for the presentation of scenarios shall respect 
the format stablished by legislator263. 
The table shows the amount of money that the investor could get back in future, considering 
different scenarios in which money are invested in Euro. The aim of the performance scenario 
is to reflect the way in which the PRIIP could perform. The standardized representation is 
oriented to allow the comparison among different products, helping the retail client in the 
assessment. The scenarios are estimation based on past performance, however, the indicators 
reported in the scenarios shall not considered as exact future values but more as a representation 
of what the investor will receive based on different market fluctuation.  
 
Figure 3. 2: Example of performance scenarios took by Appendix 1 
It is important specify that the stress scenario, which represent the worst scenario, doesn’t 
consider the scenario in which the obligor is not able to repay. When is applicable the 
presentation of an intermediate holding period, the investor shall consider that the product could 
be not easy to cash in especially before the end of recommended holding period. Thus, the 
estimation of the value of the PRIIP could be not perfect due to the presence of higher costs. 
The cost shown in the performance scenarios are about all the cost that are sustained for the 
product itself; anyway, the performance scenario may not show all the costs that the investors 
have to sustain for the services provided by the financial advisor of the distributor264. Moreover, 
the tax situation of the investor is not considered, since it is subjective for each client, but could 
have an impact over the final return of the investment. 
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For PRIIPs of Category 1 that are options or futures traded on regulated market265 the 
performance scenarios are represented in different form with respect to other PRIIPs, in fact it 
is shown through a graph. The graph presents a range of possible outcomes, so it is far to provide 
an exact indication of the return. The return is linked to the underlying’ performance and for 
each value that could assumes the underlying the graph show the corresponding profit or loss 
profile. The horizontal axis represents the prices of underlying value on the expiry date while 
the vertical axis represents the payout. The performance scenario shall specify that the 
maximum loss is equal to the whole amount invested, corresponding to the premium paid. The 
explication of performance scenarios with the use of the graph exclude the representation of all 
costs referred to tax situation, distributor and investment advisor; and includes only costs of 
product itself266. 
3.4. Other Sections 
What happens if the manufacturer of PRIIP is unable to pay out? 
The section describes in a concise manner whether, in case of loss due to inability to pay of the 
manufacturer, the loss is covered by a guarantee or a compensation scheme. Eventually the 
scheme shall be specified including the name of the guarantor and the linked risks covered by 
the scheme and also the risks that are not covered. 
What are the costs? 
The costs associated to the investment could be direct or indirect, one-off and recurring, and 
shall presented by means of an indicator of costs267. It includes the total aggregate costs 
expressed in monetary and percentage terms to ensure the comparability. Furthermore, the KID 
shall specify that advisors, distributor, any other intermediary, or seller of the PRIIP will 
provide detailed information describing any cost of the distribution not included in the indicator 
described above. In this way the intermediary provides enough information to the investor, 
enabling him to comprehend the total effect of aggregate on return. The role of advisor is not 
to provide the total costs but allow to the retailer to understand the cumulative effect of cost268. 
How long should I hold it and can I take money out early? 
The manufacturer shall show not only the recommended holding period but also the minimum 
required holding period. Eventual cooling-off period or cancellation period for the PRIIP must 
                                                          
265 Annex IV (17) Regulation 2017/653 
266 Annex V , Element K, Regulation 2017/653 
267 Art 8 (3) (f) Regulation 1286/2014 
268 See Appendix 4 
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be reported in this section, with all the applicable fees and penalties which regard risk and 
reward profile269.  
How can I complain? and Other relevant information 
These two sections constitute the conclusive part of the KID and inform the client about the 
ways in which can make a compliant about the product, the advisor or any other agents involved 
in the transaction. Other information about the pre-contractual and post-contractual stage are 
contained only whether necessary. 
 
3.5. Provision of KID 
The person advising on or selling a PRIIP shall provide to the retailer the KID in the pre-
contractual stage, in a moment considered in good time before that the investor is bounded by 
a contract or an offer relating to a PRIIP270. The KID could be provided to investor after the 
conclusion of the contract, and so in delay, only if all the following conditions are satisfied271: 
 The retailer contacts first, and so on own initiative, the seller of PRIIP and conclude the 
transaction through tools of distance communication. 
 The provision of KID is not possible 
 The retailer has been informed by the advisor or seller that the KID’s provision is not 
available, and the advisor shall offer the possibility to delay the transaction after the 
provision of KID 
 The retailer accepts to receive the KID in delay, after the conclusion of the contract 
The transaction that follows, regarding the same PRIIP of a previous transaction, do not require 
the provision of KID. The provision of KID shall be free of any charge and can be provided in 
three media272: 
1. Paper 
2. Durable media other than paper 
3. Website 
Paper form is the default option for the provision of KID and usually is offered on face-to-face 
basis, the retailer could also require another form whether preferred. The durable media other 
than paper is provided in case that it is appropriate in the context of the business conducted and 
                                                          
269 Art 8 (3) (g) (iii) Regulation 1286/2014 
270 Art 13 (1) Regulation 1286/2014 
271 Art 13 (1) Regulation 1286/2014 
272 Art 14 (2) Regulation 1286/2014 
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the retailer choose it in an evidenced way273. The provision of KID by means of the website 
allowed if it is appropriate with the context of the business conducted and the KID remains 
available on the website for the period in which the retailer may need it. Furthermore, is required 
an electronic or written notification about the address of website and where the KID can be 
accessed.
                                                          
273 Art 14 (4) Regulation 1286/2014 
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4 Revolution of Investor’s Protection through the KID 
 
4.1  Transparency Paradox 
Financial products do not exist in nature, like an apple or water, they are a conceptual 
construction274 of the manufacturer. In order to understand a PRIIP is necessary identify and 
analyze the source of the product. Before to proceed with the analysis is important to distinguish 
two different situations. The definition of the product is a separate moment with respect to the 
description.  
The definition is referred to the process of creation of the product, before the definition the 
product does not exist. Thus, this process shall be precise and technical since set the “core” of 
the product. Products are defined in a specific part of Prospectus275, and every word used to 
define the product assumes a high importance because every facet determine a different product. 
The information are written in relative short document called “final terms”276, attached to 
prospectus and other eventual document of registration to the market277. The registration 
document standard278 is technical and the information contained define the instrument. It 
presents data through a schematic layout in order to not let room for misunderstanding in the 
definition of the product. The information contained in this document are really far from the 
understandable standard of a retail client279. Anyway, the technical nature of the document is 
necessary for the definition of the product, in fact only highlighting the essential information in 
a precise way the manufacturer well defines the core of product. Any deviation from the 
essential content has an impact on the core of the product modifying it in another product. The 
simplification of the jargon could imply confusion in the essence of products; thus, the process 
of product’s definition shall be rich of meaning but poor of words280 to satisfy the aim of the 
process.  
On the opposite the description of the product is designated to the comprehension of the product 
by an investor. It is an important step for the transparency’s process since it represents the 
moment in which the flow of information reaches the investor. The information contained in 
                                                          
274 A. LUPOI, Financial products within the scope of law: rising of the financial risk as core component of any 
financial transaction, RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA, 2017 p 90 
275 A. LUPOI, Financial products within the scope of law: rising of the financial risk as core component of any 
financial transaction, RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA, 2017, page 24 
276 Directive 2010/73/EU 
277 Any Member state’s market has different specific document 
278 Annex 1 Commission Regulation 809/1004 ( valuta se allegare) 
279 ANNEX FINAL TERM 
280 A. LUPOI, Financial products within the scope of law: rising of the financial risk as core component of any 
financial transaction, RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA, 2017, page 94 
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“final terms” are typically too precise and technical to be understood by retail client. In order 
to fill this lack of financial education is necessary describe the product using easier and more 
comprehensible words, which can’t be used in the definition of the product. The fact that the 
client generally has not the knowledge necessary to understand the product is confirmed by the 
failure of previous281 transparency form. Prospectus for example, is a tool still in force but it 
contains a huge amount of information for the client and in some points is really technical and 
precise. Prospectus is a useful tool for transparency, but it is not suitable for a retail investor, 
the length282 and the density of data contained are more suitable for the analysis of a 
professional investors than a retailer. With respect to “final terms”, prospectus try to describe 
the essence of the product contained in the final term but in more comprehensible manner. The 
result is a document which describe the product in a relative easier language, but it clarifies the 
information defined in six pages by final term in more than 300 pages283. The retailer has to 
face a double barrier, on one hand the information is precise, technical and summarized in a 
schematic way but not comprehensible due to insufficient financial education. On the other 
hand, the prospectus contained all the information necessary to evaluate a document, however, 
the amount of information is too wide to be assessed correctly by the retail client. Information 
overload284 do not allow to prospectus to be an effective tool for the aim of legislator since it 
does not result clear for the retailer, enhancing the problem of transparency efficiency. 
The transparency paradox for financial product in general concern the retail client because the 
information contained in the definition of the product are not understandable by investors due 
to knowledge’s barrier. On the other side the investor is subject to information overload since 
the description is aimed to explain the product in a comprehensive way reporting too much 
information that do not allow a fair assessment of the product. 
The legislator understood that the retail client can’t understand all the detail of a complex 
investment operation, and it adapted the transparency framework to something that the investor 
can understand in intuitive way. The pursuit of a new frontier of transparency is stimulated by 
the necessity to avoid the lack of transparency, which brought to the financial crisis, and at the 
same time protect the saving of retailer which are the weaker part in the transaction. The new 
system settled by the legislator, to overcome the transparency paradox, is supported by two 
main tools: MIFID questionnaire and Key Information Document. 
                                                          
281 Respect to KID introduced by MIFID II 
282 See Appendix 2 
283 Compare Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 
284   M.J. EPPLER, J. MENGIS The Concept of Information Overload: A Review of Literature from 
Organization Science, Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and Related Disciplines, THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
2010, page 326 
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4.2 Centrality of Risk 
The “core” of the product, meant as the information contained in “Final Terms”, can’t be the 
object of transparency tools because it can’t be described to the client and at the same time the 
definition of the product can’t be modified due to limits described above. The effects of paradox 
affect negatively the investor’s protection because it is the weaker part and, he or she, invests 
money without knowing the characteristic of the investment. The legislator tries to solve this 
problem moving the aim of description from the essence of the product to the financial risk of 
the investment’s operation285. This implies a conceptual shift in the investment operation logic; 
in fact, the main aspect is no more the financial product but the financial risk that the investor 
is taking with a given operation. The product became the tool which host the financial risk of 
the operation286. 
The centrality of financial risk is the main renovation designed by MIFID II in the field of 
investor’s protection. The whole framework of investor’s protection is based on the pillar of 
financial risk. Starting from definition of investment advice of MIFID I and recalled by MIFID 
II the attention of the legislator is not focused on the product but on the “personal 
recommendation to client287”. This shift is already oriented to the centrality of client but was 
not so clear the way in which is designed the personal aspect of advisory. The principles of 
Appropriateness and Suitability288 clarifies that the personal nature of the service is the 
subjective risk profile of the investor. The legislator took risk profile of customer as cornerstone 
to solve transparency paradox for different motivations.  
The definition of the product is not a parameter that can be modified to allow an easy 
comprehension of the product, because as explained before, a variation shall imply a direct 
impact on the nature of the product. A change in the definition moment shall not allow to solve 
problems of transparency since it will cause a simplification of financial product. The 
simplification of the product’s core would cause a reduction of possible exposures and 
performance of financial products, making a step behind with respect to the level of technology 
available nowadays. Thus, an adjustment of definition’s moment does not make sense and it 
results untouchable for the legislator. The complex nature of the product shall not be modified 
even if far from the comprehension level of retail clients. The final aim of transparency is to 
                                                          
285 A. LUPOI, Financial products within the scope of law: rising of the financial risk as core component of any 
financial transaction, RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA, 2017, page 97 
286 A. LUPOI, Financial products within the scope of law: rising of the financial risk as core component of any 
financial transaction, RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO ED ECONOMIA, 2017, page 97 
287 Art 4 Directive 2004/39/EC 
288 See section 1.3) Financial Transparency, page 24 
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introduce a new disclosure mandate. Disclosure means provide information oriented to prepare 
people to take complex decisions which can result unfamiliar for them289. The description of 
the product in prospectus failed the disclosure purpose for retail investors. As already described 
prospectus is not suitable for retail investors, anyway, the problem is not linked only to 
Prospectus but also to retailer. A survey carried out by British Financial Service Authority290 
observes that the problem is not limited to the complexity of information provided but concern 
also the fact that peoples do not even read the material provided in pre-contractual stage. The 
complexity problem of prospectus, peoples’ bias that in some cases do not even read 
information and the distortion of individuals’ decisions due to implication of behavioral 
finance; are clear indexes that the description of the product is not an effective way for the 
disclosure of financial products. After the failure of product’s description, the attention has been 
moved from the description of product to the comprehension of financial risk. 
Initially, financial risk was only an accessory information contained in prospectus which 
offered sustain to the description of the product. The financial risk described wasn’t specific 
but were reported a lot of useless information about the generic risk of investment291. When the 
turnaround of transparency information took place, with KIID and then KID, it determines the 
substitution of generic risks with the specific risk of products. These information took the key 
role in disclosure’s process, and the comprehension of financial risk run by investor substitute 
the description of the product. The description of the product does not coincide with the 
comprehension of the risk292, by the way, a minimum level of information about the product is 
necessary even if not sufficient for the comprehension of financial risk. The specific risk of the 
product is liked to multiple aspects293 but until the introduction of KIID wasn’t available a 
synthetic indicator of risk for the retail investor. Risk’s centrality is sustained by the fact that a 
retailer is more interested to the return of the investment respect to the nature of the product 
purchased. Therefore, the core of investment operation became the running of a financial risk, 
finalized to get a return, and not to the purchase of a given financial product. Information are 
so oriented to disclose this aspect of investment trying to provide useful data to answer at the 
questions: What are the risk? and What can I get in return? 
                                                          
289 M. SALO, H. HAAPIO, S. PASSERA, Putting Financial Regulation to Work: Using Simplification and 
Visualization For Consumer Friendly Information, 19th INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INFORMATICS 
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290 Nowadays Financial Conduct Authority, survey was made in 2003. 
291 A. LUPOI, il tramonto dell’informazione letterale, l’alba dell’informazione numerica? RIVISTA DIRITTO 
BANCARIO, page 5 
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293 See risks involved, page 50 
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Assuming the financial risk as the new core of investment, since it is the representation of 
personal aspect of the advice activity, shall be considered that now the essential information 
provide to client concern to risk of the product and not to the type of product offered. 
Furthermore, being the risk the core of the contract, a non-compliance of the risk profile could 
involve a claim for the breach of the contract. The SRI became the benchmark for the evaluation 
of financial investment in PRIIPs for retail investor, this new form of communication renews 
the transparency process not only for the centrality of risk but also for two main characteristics: 
 Numerical Information  
 Representation of Specific Risk 
This new form of transparency results more synthetic and direct, since it does not require 
specific knowledge to be understood. The KID changes not only the core information, but also 
the way in which it is reported. The revolution was anticipated in part by KIID which entered 
in force in 2011 and settled rules only for UCITS. This document has the same main structure 
and concepts294 of KID but the technical standards295 provided by legislator are less stringent 
with respect to KID’s technical standards. The main differences are about the length, two pages 
respect the three of KID, and the presence of past scenarios performance which in KID is not 
included. This document was not analyzed in deeper way since it is not going to be valid after 
2023296 and it regard only a part of the market represented by UCITS. The main function of 
KIID is a sort of trial which paved the way for the introduction of KID. 
 
4.3 Numerical Information and Specific Risk 
The information contained in SRI297 are about the volatility of product’s price in the market, 
which represent the market risk of the product, and the probability of default, that is measured 
by the credit risk of investment operation. The numerical synthesis of these information allows 
to investor to understand in easier and more direct way the financial risk of investment 
operation; which, before the introduction of SRI, was exposed in a complex and misleading 
descriptions298. The information is immediately understood by the investor since the index is 
represented in the middle of the other values of the scale299. In this way the information is not 
misleading because the context in which it is presented provide the scale of values in which the 
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297 See section 3.3.4 Summary Risk Indicator, page 68 
298 See Chapter 1 and 2 
299 See page 69 Figure 3.1 
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single product is collocated. Furthermore, the numerical information allows the comparison of 
different product through the SRI300. This kind of information allows to client to understand 
and compare product which until the introduction of KID were not accessible for retail investor 
with a low level of financial education. Changing the design of presentation, the legislator 
changed also the core of the information, overcoming some biases that distorts the transparency 
of investment operation301. The focus of legislator on the visualization and simplification 
aspects is totally oriented to the overcame of transparency paradox. The introduction on SRI 
allows to302:  
 Offer more visible logic and a structure to the document 
 Provide immediate overview and insights for the operation  
 Clarify what written language does not manage 
 Provide alternative access to the product information303 
 Includes potential investors that were alienated by complex information 
The numerical information are not limited to SRI but includes also Performance scenario304 
which help to presents possible returns of investment. Performance scenarios support the SRI, 
providing the link between risk and possible returns of the investment. The presence of 
performance scenario allows to represent the risk of the investment in more real terms since are 
reported potential loss and profit for different scenarios. The investor that does not know the 
quantitative origin of SRI can understand and compare information anyway if he or she links 
the SRI to performance scenario in intuitive way. The fairness of indicator is guaranteed by the 
manufacturer of the product. Performance Scenario complete the numerical information, which 
results less abstract and more linked to real word. Retail Investors can assess the investment 
with data focused on the specific risk of the product, providing more precise information with 
respect to the general risk reported in Prospectus. The numerical information overcame in part 
the language barrier, for KID released in different Member States. Even if the language differ 
the numerical info allow to investor to compare the main aspect of products: Risk and Return.  
The SRI excludes from the representation a lot of information which are considered redundant 
and superfluous. For some aspects this fact could be interpreted as a loss of information’s 
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completeness but as recalled in transparency paradox and in the consequent failure of 
Prospectus, it is a necessary sacrifice for the effectiveness of transparency. Anyway the 
prospectus is a document still in force, so the investors interested to denser and huger amount 
of data about the investment can consult the Prospectus. The investor shall be aware that also 
numbers which express the SRI can be misleading. SRIs are indexes of credit and market risk, 
but it is referred to a specific holding period which can vary for different products; thus, the 
investor shall be careful in the comparison of different products. Moreover, credit and market 
risk do not represent all the risk in the market; liquidity and currency risk are excluded by SRI 
computation but can influence the final return of the investment. The advisor’s fee is not 
included in the KID, since it is composed by Manufacturer, and the investor to evaluate the 
whole cost of operation shall add this cost to the costs indicated in KID305. The SRI results so 
a good indicator for the risk of the investment; by the way, the retailer shall not incur in the 
mistake to take in consideration only the SRI for the investment decision. The SRI shall be 
compared first of all with the risk profile determined in MIFID Questionnaire, and only after 
the fulfilling of Suitability shall be performed a more specific assessment about the investment. 
Thus, the main objective of SRI is to provide a guideline easy to follow for the retail investor, 
which is not able to understand what the risk he or she is taking. Investors shall be aware that 
the information summarized in KID could be object of further variation after the conclusion of 
pre-contractual stage306. The centrality of risk is an important revolution in the field of 
investor’s protection, the information about the characteristic of the product passed in the 
background but shall not be forgotten by the investor since can still play a role in the investment 
decision since SRI do not consider all the risks but only the two main. 
 
4.4 The Investor Protection  
The document aimed to protect the investors in the advisory activity are the KID, designed by 
manufacturer, and the MIFID questionnaire defined by the advisor. These tools are 
complementary because collect and represent necessary information from two opposite side of 
investment operation, necessary for the fulfillment of Suitability’s principle. KID is oriented to 
provide information about the product in a more effective and direct way with respect previous 
form of transparency. The aim is to protect the investor from misleading information which 
could be provided by advisors307, the KID is written by manufacturer also to avoid the 
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possibility that the advisor exploits the conflict of interest writing down misleading KID. When 
the advisor and the manufacturer are the same entity the legislator try to protect the investor 
with the new rules about incentives and fees308. The source of information of KID is 
standardized and based on quantitative analysis of past data related to possible future scenarios. 
The discussion about the methodology implemented for the SRI and the Performance scenario 
is still open, by the way at nowadays is impossible provide an empirical analysis about 
correctness of numerical indicator of KID with respect real performance. By the way in future 
can be interesting analyze, if and when, the insight provided by performance scenarios are 
respected in real world, and which performance’s differences present products with the same 
SRI. The KID is the tool which was missing to the transparency process, in fact as described 
above it provide more “democratic” information accessible and understandable by everybody. 
The degree of protection is higher providing less information, because the KID does not contain 
all the characteristics of the product, but at the same time is understandable by everybody. The 
decision of legislator is based especially on retail investor needs; historically this category 
represent the layer of population which lose more savings and wealth due to lack of effective 
transparency in financial sector’s investment. The KID represents the main tool for the 
protection of investment, especially in this historical moment, where the European Banking 
sector in going to face the end of quantitative easing program of ECB and the consequent 
reduction of bank’s liquidity which shall involve the retailer. The role of KID is to ensure 
protection of investor with the aim to restore the confidence of retail clients.  
The blind spot of the investor protection mechanism is represented by the MIFID questionnaire 
and the consequent definition of investor’s risk profile. The new mechanism substitutes the 
centrality of the product with the centrality of risk, and it bases the intuitive aspect on a single 
numerical indicator. The fulfillment of suitability principle, which is the cornerstone of new 
mechanism, is based on the match between risk level of product and risk profile of investment. 
The profiling of client is the output of MIFID Questionnaire309, by the way, different 
investigations based on descriptive and empirical approach disclose worrying findings. The 
lack of standardization in questionnaire’s structure and content show, in Italy, large differences 
in term of number of questions and fields investigated310. These differences have dramatic 
effects on the investor protection, since different questionnaires could produce different risk 
profiles for the same investors, undermining the correct fulfillment of suitability principle. The 
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309 See section 1.3.1 Context of application, page 28 
310 See “Questionnaire”, page 30 
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empirical part of the analysis311 show that a sample of 100 potential investors obtain different 
risk profiles filling different questionnaires. The Legislator shall impose a standardized 
Questionnaire to ensure the investor’s protection; moreover, the questionnaire do not seem 
oriented to the subjective characteristic of client but anchored to traditional asset allocation 
strategies312. The problem of lack of standardization is followed by the personal nature of 
information collected in questionnaire which is affected by threats concerning the behavioral 
finance313. The lack of complete rational behavior of individual affect different economic fields 
and risk compliance is not excluded. These problems shall be solved with a standardized 
questionnaire which take into consideration the problems implicated by behavioral finance.  
This effort of legislator to renovate client’s protection field is aimed to reach a basic level of 
transparency which allows, to retail investor, to understand whether an investment risk is 
suitable for his or her preferences. The attention about the risk shall increase for investor but 
also for advisor because with the new legislation the risk is the main object of the advisory 
activity. The new perspective of investment advisory implies a higher attention in the definition 
of product’s risk for the manufacturer and an enhanced attention in the compliance of new rules 
and requirements. The new mechanism provides higher standards in the pre-contractual stage, 
in order to increase the protection of the investors; and at the same time ensure a more effective 
transparency through information more direct and comprehensible.
                                                          
311 N. MARINELLI, C. MAZZOLI, Profiling investors with the MiFID: current practice and future prospects, 
Research paper. 
312 N. MARINELLI, C. MAZZOLI, Profiling investors with the MiFID: current practice and future prospects, 
Research paper, page 15 
313 See “Impacts of Behavioral Finance over MIFID Questionnaire”, page 32 
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CONCLUSION 
The problems outlined by financial crisis obliged the European legislator to renovate the 
investor protection and to restore the confidence of retail client. After the renovation of 
investment advisory, the legislator sets a new mechanism for the protection of the retail client. 
The mechanism requires a match between the risk of the product and the risk profile of the 
client, in accordance with the fulfillment of suitability’s principle. 
 The dissertation analyzes mainly the flow of information provided by KID and so referred to 
the description of product’s risk and possible returns. This analysis reveals that the new tool 
improves the protection of the investor respect to unsuitable investment. The centrality of risk 
and the numerical information help the retailer to be more aware about the basic information to 
know about the investment operation. The intuitive nature of numerical index makes accessible 
the information to a wider range of investors, since it does not require a financial knowledge to 
be understood. Risk’s centrality on the other hand allows to overcome the transparency paradox, 
basing the disclosure process on a more practical and understandable measurement. The 
characteristics of KID make the information about the investment more comprehensible by the 
retail investor and so more useful for the disclosure process. The standard provided by the 
legislator to the manufacturer for the preparation of KID helps to contrast the asymmetric 
information between advisor and investor. From the point of view of risk profiling of investor, 
the tool settled by the legislator has some lack. The questionnaire that should evaluate the risk 
profile is not a standardized instrument and the dynamics of assessment are influenced by a lot 
of perception’s distortion, described by the behavioral finance. These aspects of MIFID 
questionnaire have a negative impact over the protection of the client since different 
questionnaires provide different risk profiles for the same investors. This lack has a negative 
effect over the functioning of the entire mechanism of protection. The legislator should correct 
the questionnaire to ensure a proper functioning of the new investor’s protection mechanism.
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APPENDIX 3 
 
The appendix number 3 shows the content of Prospectus, considering page’s number shall be 
take in consideration that the original document provides information in English and German 
language; thus, the real number of pages is the half. 
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The information useful for the client which 
want to evaluate the product described in 
Appendix 1 and defined in Appendix 2 are 
available at section Y called Barrier Reverse 
Convertibles, at page 320. It is an indicator of 
complexity of the document. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
ANNEX VI 
REGULATION 2017/653 
METHODOLOGY FOR THE CALCULATION OF COSTS 
PART I 
(not included I list of cost for UCITS in this Appendix) 
II.LIST OF COSTS OF PRIPS OTHER THAN INVESTMENT FUNDS  
Costs to be disclosed  
One-off costs  
27. A one-off cost is an entry and exit cost which include initial charges, commissions or any 
other amount paid directly by the retail investor or deducted from a payment received by or due 
to the retail investor.  
28. One-off costs are borne by a PRIP other than an investment fund, whether they represent 
expenses necessarily incurred in its operation, or the remuneration of any party connected with 
it or providing services to it. One-off entry costs and charges  
29. One-off entry costs and charges include, but are not limited to, the following types that shall 
be taken into account in the cost amount to be disclosed for PRIPs other than investment funds:  
(a) sales commissions;  
(b) structuring costs, including market-making costs (spread) and settlement costs;  
(c) hedging costs (to ensure that the PRIIP manufacturer is able to replicate the 
performance of the derivative component of the structured product — these costs 
include transaction costs)  
(d) legal fees;  
(e) costs for capital guarantee;  
(f) implicit premium paid to the issuer.  
One-off exit costs and charges  
30. One-off exit costs and charges include, but are not limited to, the following types that shall 
be taken into account in the amount to be disclosed for PRIPs other than investment funds:  
(a) proportional fees;  
(b) bid-mid spread to sell the product and any explicit costs or penalties for early exit 
applicable. The estimation of the bid-mid spread shall be done in relation to the 
availability of a secondary market, to the market conditions and the type of product. In 
the situation where the PRIIP manufacturer (or a related third party) is the only available 
counterparty to buy the product on the secondary market, it shall estimate the exit costs 
to be added to the fair value of the product according to its internal policies;  
(c) contract-for-difference (CFD) related costs such as:  
100 Key Information Document, a New Tool to Protect Investors 
(i) commissions charged by CFD providers — general commission or a 
commission on each trade — i.e. on opening and closing a contract;  
(ii) CFD trading such as bid-ask spreads, daily and overnight financing costs, 
account management fees and taxes which are not already included in the fair 
value. 
Recurring Costs  
31. Recurring costs are payments regularly deducted from all payments due to the retail investor 
or from the amount invested.  
32. Recurring costs include all types of cost borne by a PRIP other than an investment fund 
whether they represent expenses necessarily incurred in its operation, or the remuneration of 
any party connected with it or providing services to it.  
33. The following list is indicative but not exhaustive of the types of recurring charge that, 
where they are deducted or charged separately, shall be taken into account in the amount to be 
disclosed:  
(a) costs related to coupon payments;  
(b) costs of the underlying, if any.  
Costs of PRIPs referred to in point 17 of Annex IV  
34. One-off exit costs and charges are exchange fees, clearing fees and settlement fees where 
known.  
35. Recurring costs are hedging costs borne under normal market conditions and stressed 
market conditions. Calculation of implicit costs of PRIPs other than investment funds  
36. For the purposes of the calculation of the implicit costs embedded in PRIPs, the PRIIP 
manufacturer shall refer to the issue price and, after the subscription period, to the price 
available to purchase the product on a secondary market.  
37. The difference between the price and the fair value of the product is considered as an 
estimation of the total entry costs included in the price. If the PRIIP manufacturer is unable to 
distinguish the relevant implicit costs to be disclosed as referred to in point 29 of this Annex 
using the difference between the price and the fair value, it shall liaise with the issuer of the 
different components of the product, or the relevant body, in order to gather the relevant 
information on those costs.  
38. Fair value is the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in 
an orderly transaction in the principal (or most advantageous) market at the measurement date 
under current market conditions (i.e. an exit price) regardless of whether that price is directly 
observable or estimated using another valuation technique.  
39. The fair value policy that governs the measurement of the fair value shall set a series of 
rules including in the following areas:  
(a) governance;  
(b) methodology for the calculation of the fair value.  
40. The rules referred to in point 39 of this Annex shall aim at outlining a valuation process 
that:  
(a) complies with the applicable accounting standards, in relation to fair value;  
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(b) makes sure that internal pricing models for PRIPs are consistent with the 
methodologies, modelling and standards used by the PRIIP manufacturer to value its 
own portfolio under the hypothesis that the product is available for sale or held for 
trading;  
(c) is consistent with the level of complexity of the product and the type of underlying;  
(d) takes into account the issuer credit risk and the uncertainty about the underlying;  
(e) sets the parameters to identify an active market in order to avoid risk mispricing that 
could lead in extreme cases to significantly inaccurate estimates;  
(f) maximize the use of relevant observable market inputs and minimizes the use of 
unobservable inputs.  
41. The fair value of a structured product shall be determined on the basis of:  
(a) market prices, where available or efficiently formed;  
(b) internal pricing models using as an input market values which are indirectly 
connected to the product, derived from products with similar characteristics 
(comparable approach);  
(c) internal pricing models based on inputs which are not derived directly from market 
data for which estimations and assumptions must be formulated (mark-to-model 
approach).  
42. If the fair value cannot be derived from market prices, it shall be calculated using a valuation 
technique that is able to represent properly the different factors affecting the product payoff 
structure making maximum use of market data. 
43. The valuation technique referred to in point 42 of this Annex shall consider the following 
according to the complexity of the product:  
(a) the use of recent arm's length market transactions between knowledgeable, 
professional counterparties;  
(b) reference to the current market price of another instrument that is substantially the 
same;  
(c) the use of an appropriate discounted cash-flow model where the likelihood of each 
cash flow is determined using an appropriate model of asset price evolution.  
44. In the case of subscription products, the fair value shall be calculated on the date when the 
product terms are determined. This valuation date shall be close to the beginning of the 
subscription period. Where long offering periods or high market volatility exists, a criterion to 
update cost information shall be defined.  
45. Where preliminary terms are used, costs shall be calculated by using the minimum terms of 
the product.  
46. Where variable subscription prices are used, a procedure on how to incorporate and disclose 
the cost effect of the varying subscription price shall be defined.  
 
III.LIST OF COSTS OF INSURANCE-BASED INVESTMENT PRODUCTS  
Costs to be disclosed 
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 One-off costs  
47. A one-off cost is an entry and exit cost which includes initial charges, commissions or any 
other amount paid directly by the retail investor or deducted from the first payment or from a 
limited number of payments due to the retail investor or from a payment upon redemption or 
termination of the product.  
48. One-off costs are borne by an insurance-based investment product, whether they represent 
expenses necessarily incurred in its operation, or the remuneration of any party connected with 
it or providing services to it.  
49. One-off costs include, but are not limited to, the following types of entry costs and charges 
that shall be taken into account in the amount to be disclosed for insurance-based investment 
products:  
(a) structuring or marketing costs;  
(b) acquisition, distribution, sales costs;  
(c) processing/operating costs (including costs for the management of the insurance 
cover);  
(d) cost part of biometric risk premiums referred to in point 59 of this Annex; 
(e) costs of holding required capital (up front part to be disclosed insofar as they are 
charged).  
Recurring costs  
50. Recurring costs are payments regularly deducted from all payments from the retail investor 
or from the amount invested or amounts that are not allocated to the retail investor according 
to a profit sharing mechanism. 
51. The recurring costs include all types of costs borne by an insurance-based investment 
product whether they represent expenses necessarily incurred in its operation, or the 
remuneration of any party connected with it or providing services to it.  
52. The following list is indicative but not exhaustive of the types of recurring charge that shall 
be taken into account in the amount of the ‘Other ongoing costs’ in table 2 of Annex VII:  
(a) structuring or marketing costs; 
(b) acquisition, distribution, sales costs;  
(c) processing/operating costs (including costs for the management of insurance cover);  
(d) cost part of biometric risk premiums referred to in point 59 of this Annex;  
(e) other administrative costs; 12.4.2017 L 100/45 Official Journal of the European 
Union EN 
(f) costs of holding capital (recurring part to be disclosed insofar as they are charged);  
(g) any amount implicitly charged on the amount invested such as the costs incurred for 
the management of the investments of the insurance company (deposit fees, costs for 
new investments, etc.); 
(h) payments to third parties to meet costs necessarily incurred in connection with the 
acquisition or disposal of any asset owned by the insurance-based investment product 
(including transaction costs as referred to in points 7 to 23 of this Annex).  
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53. Where an insurance-based investment product invests a part of its assets in UCITS or AIFs, 
in a PRIIP other than UCITS or AIFs or in an investment product other than a PRIIP, points 
5(l), 5(m) and 5(n) of this Annex shall be applied respectively. 
Cost disclosure of the biometric risk premium of insurance based investment products 
Costs part of biometric risk premiums  
54. Biometric risk premiums are those premiums paid directly by the retail investor or deducted 
from the amounts credited to the mathematical provision or from the participation bonus of the 
insurance policy, that are intended to cover the statistical risk of benefit payments from 
insurance coverage.  
55. The fair value of biometric risk premiums is the expected present value, according to the 
interest rates referred to in point 71(a) of this Annex, of the future benefit payments from 
insurance coverage taking into account the following:  
(a) best estimate assumptions on these benefit payments derived from the individual risk 
profile of the portfolio of the individual manufacturer;  
(b) other payoffs related to insurance cover (rebates on biometric risk premiums paid 
back to the the retail investors, increase of benefit payments, reduction of future 
premiums, etc.) resulting from profit sharing mechanisms (legal and/or contractual).  
56. Best estimate assumptions on future benefit payments from insurance coverage shall be set 
in a realistic way.  
57. The estimated future benefit payments shall not include prudency margins or costs for the 
management of the insurance cover.  
58. For manufacturers within the scope of Directive 2009/138/EC these best estimate 
assumptions shall be consistent with the respective assumptions used for the calculation of the 
technical provisions in the Solvency II balance sheet.  
59. The cost part of biometric risk premiums is the difference between biometric risk premiums 
charged to the retail investor referred to in point 54 of this Annex and the fair value of the 
biometric risk premiums referred to in point 55 of this Annex.  
60. A PRIIP manufacturer may include the full biometric risk premiums in the calculation of 
one-off costs or recurring costs in the place of the cost part of those premiums. 
 
PART II 
Summary cost indicators and compound effect of the costs 
I SUMMARY COST INDICATORS 
61. The summary cost indicator of the PRIIP is the reduction of the yield due to total costs 
calculated in accordance with points 70 to 72 of this Annex.  
62. For the calculation of the summary cost indicator the costs to be disclosed referred to in 
point 72 of this Annex shall be the total costs. This shall equal for investment funds the sum of 
the costs as referred to in points 1 and 2 of this Annex plus the sum of the costs as referred to 
in points 4 and 6 of this Annex; for PRIPs other than investment funds, except PRIIPs referred 
in point 17 of Annex IV, the sum of the costs as referred to in points 27 and 28 of this Annex 
plus the sum of the costs as referred to in points 31 and 32 of this Annex; for PRIIPs referred 
to in point 17 of Annex IV, the sum of the costs as referred to in points 34 and 35 of this Annex; 
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and for insurance-based investment products, the sum of the costs as referred to in points 47 
and 48 plus the sum of the costs as referred to in points 50 and 51 of this Annex. The total costs 
shall also include exit penalties, where relevant.  
One-off costs and one-off costs ratios  
63. The entry and exit costs ratio of the PRIIP shall be the reduction of the annual yield due to 
entry and exit costs calculated according to points 70 to 72 of this Annex.  
64. For the calculation of the entry and exit costs ratio the costs to be disclosed referred to in 
point 72 of this Annex shall for investments funds be the entry and exit costs according to points 
1 and 2 of this Annex; points 27 and 28 of this Annex for PRIPs other than investment funds, 
except PRIIPs referred in point 17 of Annex IV; point 35 for PRIIPs referred in point 17 of 
Annex IV; and points 47 and 48 of this Annex for insurance-based investment products. Exit 
costs shall also include exit penalties, where relevant. 
 Recurring costs, portfolio transaction costs and insurance costs/other recurring costs ratios  
65. The portfolio transaction costs, insurance costs and other recurring costs ratio of the PRIIP 
shall be the reduction of the annual yield due to portfolio transaction costs and other recurring 
costs calculated according to points 70 to 72 of this Annex.  
66. For the calculation of the portfolio transaction costs ratio and the insurance costs ratio the 
following shall apply: 
(a) for the calculation of the portfolio transaction, the costs to be disclosed referred to 
in point 72 shall be the portfolio transaction costs according to points 7 to 23 of this 
Annex for investment funds, point 29(c) of this Annex for PRIPs other than investment 
funds, except PRIIPs referred in point 17 of Annex IV, and point 52(h) of this Annex 
for insurance based investment products; 
(b) for the calculation of the insurance costs ratio, the costs to be disclosed referred to 
in point 72 of this Annex shall be the insurance costs according to points 59 and 60 of 
this Annex for insurance based investment products. 
67. The other recurring costs ratio shall be the reduction of the annual yield due to other 
recurring costs that is calculated as the difference between the summary cost indicator 
according to point 61 of this Annex and the sum of the one-off costs ratio, according to point 
63 of this Annex, plus portfolio transaction costs ratio, according to point 66(a), plus insurance 
costs ratio, according to point 66(b) of this Annex, plus the incidental costs ratios, according to 
point 68 of this Annex. 
Incidental costs and incidental costs ratios (performance fees and carried interests ratio)  
68. For the calculation of the performance fees ratio, the cost to be disclosed referred to in point 
72 shall be the portfolio incidental costs according to point 6(a) of this Annex for investment 
funds. For the calculation of the carried interests ratio, the cost to be disclosed referred to in 
point 72 of this Annex shall be the portfolio incidental costs according to point 6(b) of this 
Annex for investment funds.  
69. The ‘ongoing costs’, ‘performance fees’ and ‘carried interests’ as referred to in Annex VII 
are respectively the ‘recurring costs’, ‘performance fees ratio’ and ‘carried interests ratio’ as 
referred to in this Annex and in Article 5.  
Calculation of summary cost indicator  
70. The summary cost indicator shall be calculated as the difference between two percentages 
i and r where r is the annual internal rate of return in relation to gross payments by the retail 
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investor and estimated benefit payments to the retail investor during the recommended holding 
period and i is the annual internal rate of return for the respective cost free scenario.  
71. The estimation of future benefit payments under point 70 of this Annex shall be based on 
the following assumptions:  
(a) except for PRIIPs as referred to in point 17 of Annex IV, the annual internal rate of 
return, i.e. the performance, of the PRIIP shall be calculated applying the methodology 
and the underlying hypothesis used for the estimation of the moderate scenario from the 
performance scenarios section of the key information document;  
(b) the benefit payments shall be estimated under the assumption that all costs included 
in the total costs according to point 62 of this Annex are deducted;  
(c) for PRIIPs as referred to in point 17 of Annex IV and for UCITS or non-UCITS 
funds for which PRIIP manufacturers use the key investor information document in 
accordance with Article 14(2) of this Regulation, the performance shall be 3 %.  
72. For the purpose of the calculation of the cost free scenario as referred to in point 70 of this 
Annex the following shall apply:  
(a) for the calculation of i either gross payments by the retail investor from the 
calculation of r shall be reduced by the costs to be disclosed or the projected benefit 
payments to the retail investor from the calculation of r shall be increased under the 
assumption that the amounts of the costs to be disclosed had additionally been invested. 
Then i is the annual internal rate of return in relation to these adjusted payments by and 
to the retail investor; ( 
b) where costs to be disclosed can be expressed as a constant percentage of the value of 
the assets they may be disregarded in the calculation described in point 72(a) of this 
Annex and instead be added to the percentage of the annual internal rate of return i for 
the respective cost free scenario afterwards.  
Specific requirements for PRIPs other than investment funds 
 73. For the purpose of the calculation of the cost free scenario as referred to in point 70 of this 
Annex for PRIPs other than investment funds, gross payments by the retail investor from the 
calculation of r, as referred to in point 72 of this Annex, shall be reduced by the costs to be 
disclosed.  
Specific requirements for insurance-based investment products  
74. For the purpose of the calculations described in points 70 to 72 of this Annex, it shall be 
assumed that, for insurance-based investment products, no payments resulting from insurance 
coverage occur during the holding period. That is to say, the calculation of the summary cost 
indicator shall be solely based on estimated endowment benefit payments.  
75. To the extent recurring and one-off costs are covered by explicit costs that are a fixed part 
of the premium calculation of the product the calculation of recurring and one-off costs shall 
be based on these explicit costs. 
76. For profit participation for insurance based investment products the following shall apply:  
(a) when calculating recurring costs and one-off costs for insurance-based investment 
products amounts retained from the investment return through profit sharing 
mechanisms shall be considered as costs;  
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(b) where a part of the costs is returned to retail investors by separate cost bonuses this 
shall be considered as a cost rebate that reduces cost deductions provided:  
(i) that the cost bonuses are declared separately from other parts of the 
participation bonus and are intended for refunding parts of the costs by the 
contractual terms of the product.  
(ii) that the PRIIP manufacturer can substantiate on the basis of sound actuarial 
methods that expected future cost bonuses are covered by expected future profits 
that result from prudent assumptions on future costs.  
Calculation of ratios 
Anti-double counting principle  
77. If one type of cost is covered by two or more types of costs as referred to in this Annex, that 
type of cost shall only be accounted for once in the calculation of the indicators (ratios) which 
are based on it. 
Other specifications  
78. The ratios shall be expressed as a percentage to two decimal places.  
79. The ratios shall be calculated at least once a year.  
80. The ratios shall be based on the most recent cost calculations which the PRIIP manufacturer 
has determined. Without prejudice to point 77 of this Annex, the costs are assessed on an ‘all 
taxes included’ basis. 
As for investment funds the following shall apply:  
(a) a separate calculation shall be performed for each share class, but if the units of two 
or more classes rank pari passu, a single calculation may be performed for them;  
(b) in the case of a fund which is an umbrella, each constituent compartment or sub-
fund shall be treated separately for the purpose of this Annex, but any charges 
attributable to the fund as a whole shall be apportioned among all of the sub-funds on a 
basis that is fair to all investors.  
81. Apart from the first calculation for a new PRIIP, and if not stated otherwise, the ratios shall 
be calculated at least once a year, on an ex-post basis. Where it is considered unsuitable to use 
the ex-post figure because of a material change, an estimate may be used instead until reliable 
ex-post figures reflecting the impact of the material change become available.  
82. The ex-post figures shall be based on recent cost calculations which the PRIIP manufacturer 
has determined on reasonable grounds to be appropriate for that purpose. The figures may be 
based on the costs set out in the PRIIP's statement of operations published in its latest annual 
or half-yearly report, if that statement is sufficiently recent. It is not sufficiently recent, a 
comparable calculation based on the costs charged during a more recent 12-month period shall 
be used instead.  
83. Information about the ratios that were applicable during previous years/periods shall be 
published at the location which is specified in the key information document as the general 
source of further information for investors who require it.  
84. Where the costs attributable to an underlying UCITS or AIF are to be taken into account 
the following shall apply:  
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(a) the cost indicator of each underlying UCITS or AIF shall be pro-rated according to 
the proportion of the PRIIP's net asset value which that UCITS or AIF represents at the 
relevant date being the date at which the PRIIP's figures are taken;  
(b) all the pro-rated figures shall be added to the total cost figure of the investing PRIIP 
itself, thus presenting a single total.  
Calculation methodology for new PRIIPs  
85. In place of ex-post data, estimates shall be used in the calculation of the different types of 
costs. Such estimates shall be carried out by adopting as proxies either a comparable PRIIP or 
a peer group.  
86. For PRIIPs which charge a fixed all-inclusive fee, that fee shall be used provided it includes 
all costs to be presented under the PRIIPs cost disclosure requirements.  
87. For PRIIPs which set a cap or maximum on the amount that can be charged, and provided 
it includes all costs to be presented under the PRIIPs cost disclosure requirements, that cap or 
maximum shall be used instead so long as the PRIIP manufacturer gives a commitment to 
respect the published figure and to absorb any costs that would otherwise cause it to be 
exceeded.  
88. If, in the PRIIP manufacturer's opinion, expressing a figure to two decimal places would be 
likely to suggest a spurious degree of accuracy to investors, it shall be sufficient to express that 
figure to one decimal place.  
89. The PRIIP manufacturer shall ensure that the accuracy of the estimated figure is kept under 
review. The PRIIP manufacturer shall determine when it is appropriate to begin using ex-post 
figures rather than an estimate; but in any case it shall, no later than 12 months after the date on 
which the PRIIP was first offered for sale in any Member State, review the accuracy of the 
estimate by calculating a figure on an ex-post basis.  
II COMPOUND EFFECT OF THE COSTS 
Common requirements to all types of PRIIPs  
90. The table(s) referred to in Article 5 shall contain an indication of the total costs in monetary 
and percentage terms for the case that the retail investor invests, respectively 10 000 EUR (for 
all PRIIPs except regular premium insurance-based investment products), or 1 000 EUR yearly 
(for regular premium insurance-based investment products) during different holding periods, 
including the recommended holding period. The holding periods to be shown are those referred 
to in points 14 to 16 of Annex IV. Where a product is considered not to have an alternative 
liquidity facility promoted by the PRIIP manufacturer or a third party, or where there is an 
absence of liquidity arrangements, or for those PRIIPs as referred to in point 17 of Annex IV, 
that indication of costs may be shown only at maturity or at the end of the recommended holding 
period. 
91. Where the currency of the PRIIP is not in Euros, an amount of a similar magnitude to those 
set out in point 90 of this Annex and which is cleanly divisible by 1 000 shall be used.  
92. The total costs shall include one-off, recurring and incidental costs, and, where relevant, 
exit penalties. 
93. Exit penalties are to be distinguished from other exit costs which have to be paid in any case 
and therefore always need to be included in the one-off costs.  
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94. The relevance of exit penalties depends on the holding period of the investment and the 
exact moment when the products cashed in. Exit penalties depends on the holding period of the 
investment is kept for the recommended holding period.  
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APPENDIX 5 
 It is exposed the tables settled by Regulation 2016/1800, that shall be followed for the 
conversion of credit rating in Credit Quality Steps
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